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Summary 
The big influx of people seeking asylum in EU Member States in recent 
years has led to many asylum seekers having to wait a long time for a 
decision on their asylum applications. For over 25 years, the EU has been 
encouraging Member States to adopt procedural measures in their national 
legislations to streamline asylum procedures and in July 2016, the EU 
Commission presented a proposal for a new Regulation on asylum 
procedures which proposes further measures to speed up asylum procedures 
or deflect the responsibility for asylum seekers to other countries.  
 
While it is commonly seen as being in the interest of both asylum seekers 
and Member States that decisions on asylum applications are taken as soon 
as possible, measures to streamline asylum procedures are not 
uncontroversial since they risk compromising the protection of asylum 
seekers and be at variance with fundamental legal principles of international 
law. 
 
This thesis studies the compatibility of three specific articles, closely related 
to the streamlining of asylum procedures, in the EU Commission’s Proposal 
for a new Procedures Regulation with obligations imposed on EU Member 
States by the principle of non-refoulement. The studied articles are the ones 
on admissibility procedures, accelerated procedures and implicit 
withdrawals of asylum applications. By conducting this study, this thesis 
wishes, not only to assess the compatibility of the specific Proposal with the 
principle of non-refoulement, but to contribute to a general discussion on the 
legal limit of states strives to streamline asylum procedures.  
 
In the second chapter, the three studied articles of the Proposal are 
thoroughly analysed. In the next chapter, the most commonly accepted 
sources of international law are interpreted in order to examine what 
obligations the principle of non-refoulement impose on Member States 
when handling asylum applications. The results of the third chapter are then 
applied in the fourth chapter to assess whether the articles studied of the 
Proposal are compatible with the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
The conclusions are that articles on admissibility procedures and accelerated 
procedures, at least in theory, probably are compatible with the principle of 
non-refoulement. The article on implicitly withdrawals of applications, 
however, will possibly lead to a breach of the prohibition on refoulement if 
adopted in the proposed way.  
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Sammanfattning 
Det stora inflödet av asylsökande till EU under de senaste åren har lett till 
att många asylsökande tvingas vänta lång tid på ett beslut i deras asylärende. 
EU har i över 25 år uppmuntrat medlemsstater att vidta processuella 
åtgärder i sina respektive nationella lagstiftningar för att effektivisera och 
rationalisera asylprocessen. I juli 2016 presenterade EU-kommissionen ett 
förslag till en ny asylprocedurförordning som föreslår ytterligare åtgärder 
för att snabba upp asylprocessen eller avleda ansvaret för asylsökande till 
andra länder. 
 
Samtidigt som det är en vanlig åsikt att det ligger i både den asylsökandes 
och medlemsstatens intresse att beslut i asylärende fattas så snabbt som 
möjligt är rationaliserings- och effektiviseringsåtgärder av asylprocessen 
kontroversiella eftersom sådana åtgärder riskerar att äventyra skyddet av 
asylsökande och kan vara i strid med fundamentala principer i internationell 
rätt.  
 
Detta arbete studerar huruvida tre specifika artiklar i EU-kommissionens 
förslag till en ny asylprocedurförordning, nära relaterade till effektivisering 
och rationalisering av asylprocessen, är förenliga med de skyldigheter som 
principen om non-refoulement ställer på EU:s medlemsstater. De studerade 
artiklarna är de som rör vilka ansökningar som inte kan tas upp till 
prövning, vilka ansökningar som ska genomgå ett påskyndat förfarande och 
förfarandet om implicit återkallade ansökningar. Förhoppningen är att detta 
arbete inte endast ska utgöra en studie av det specifika lagförslaget utan 
också bidra till en mer allmän diskussion om i vilken utsträckning principen 
om non-refoulement begränsar EU-staters möjligheter att effektivisera och 
rationalisera asylprocessen.  
 
I det andra kapitlet görs en noggrann analys av de tre studerade artiklarna. I 
det efterföljande kapitlet tolkas de mest erkända källorna i internationell rätt 
för att undersöka vilka skyldigheter principen om non-refoulement 
uppställer på EU:s medlemsstater när dessa hanterar asylansökningar. 
Resultateten av undersökningen i det tredje kapitlet ligger sedan till grund 
för bedömningen i det fjärde kapitlet huruvida de studerade artiklarna är 
förenliga med principen om non-refoulement.  
 
Slutsatserna är att artiklarna som rör vilka ansökningar som inte kan tas upp 
till prövning och vilka ansökningar som ska genomgå ett påskyndat 
förfarande förmodligen, åtminstone i teorin, är förenliga med principen om 
non-refoulement. Artikeln rörande förfarandet om implicit återkallade 
ansökningar kommer däremot med största sannolikhet leda till en 
överträdelse av förbudet mot refoulement om den antas i den form förslaget 
anger.  
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Abbreviations & definitions 
1967 Protocol 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
Dublin Regulation 
Proposal 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national or a stateless person (recast)’ 
COM(2016) 270 final   
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
EU European Union 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICJ Statute Statute of the International Court of Justice 
ILC International Law Commission 
Procedures Directive Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 
on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status 
[2005] OJ L326/13 
Procedures Regulation 
Proposal 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Common Procedure for International 
Protection in the Union and Repealing Directive 
2013/32/EU’ COM(2016) 467 final 
Recast Procedures 
Directive 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/60 
Recast Qualification 
Directive 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection 
 5 
granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/9 
Refugee Convention 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (with 
annex). Concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969 
Qualification 
Regulation Proposal 
Commission, ’Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on 
standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection and for the content of the protection 
granted and amending Council Directive 
2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents’ COM(2016) 466 final   
  
The term 
‘asylum’ 
Protection offered to an alien on account of a threat abroad, by a state within 
its territory 
 
The term 
‘asylum seeker’ 
An individual who has expressed the intention to apply for ‘asylum’ to the 
authorities, irrespective of whether an official application has been lodged 
or not.   
 
The term 
‘international protection’ 
The refugee and subsidiary protection status as defined in the Recast 
Qualification Directive 
 
The term 
‘receiving state’ or ‘receiving country’ 
A state to which a ‘sending state’ has or wishes to remove an asylum seeker 
 
The term 
‘refugee’ 
An individual who has been granted refugee status in accordance with the 
refugee definition in the Refugee Convention, or an ‘asylum seeker’ who 
has not yet been found not the met the refugee definition after a fair refugee 
determination procedure.  
 6 
 
 
The term 
‘sending state’ or ‘sending country’ 
A state which has or wants to remove an asylum seeker to another country 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In 2016, EU+ countries1 delivered over 1,1 million asylum decisions in first 
instance, an increase by 87 % compared to the year before.2 Despite this 
dramatic increase of decisions issued, there were, at the end of December 
2016, over 870,000 asylum cases awaiting a first-instance decision in the 28 
Member States of the EU, Cyprus not included.3 56 % of these cases were 
pending six months or more.4  
 
Starting in the 1990’s, EU legislation has encouraged Member States to 
adopt procedural concepts to speed up asylum procedures or deflect the 
responsibility for asylum seekers to other countries without assessing the 
merits of the applicants’ claims.5 Under the current EU legislation, Member 
States are permitted to accelerate certain procedures and use ‘safe country’ 
concepts to declare applications inadmissible.6 While it is a common view 
that it is in the interest of both asylum seekers and EU Member States, that 
decisions on asylum applications are taken as soon as possible, the strive to 
streamline asylum procedures is not uncontroversial as it may compromise 
the protection of asylum seekers and be at variance with fundamental legal 
principles of international law, such as the principle of non-refoulement.7  
                                                
1 EU+ is composed of the 28 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland: European 
Asylum Support Office, ’Latest asylum trends – 2016 overview’  
<www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends> accessed 16 February 2017. 
2 Asylum Support Office, ’Latest asylum trends – 2016 overview’  
<www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends> accessed 16 February 2017. 
3 European Asylum Support Office, ’Latest Asylum Trends – December 2016’ 
<www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends> accessed 13 February 2017. 
4 European Asylum Support Office, ’Latest Asylum Trends – December 2016’ 
<www.easo.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends> accessed 13 February 2017. 
5 For instance, in 1992, the Council of the EU urged Member States to implement 
accelerated procedures for assessing applications regarded as ‘manifestly unfounded’: 
Council of the European Union, Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly 
Unfounded Applications for Asylum ("London Resolution") (1992) 
<www.refworld.org/docid/3f86bbcc4.html accessed 21 February 2017. See also: Sharon 
Oakley, ’Accelerated Procedures for Asylum in the European Union:  
Fairness Versus Efficiency’ (2007) Sussex Migration Working Paper no. 43 
<www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mwp43.pdf&site=252> accessed 17 
February 2017, 3–4. 
6 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) [2013] 
OJ L180/60 (Recast Procedures Directive), arts 31(8), 33(2) b–c. 
7 Recast Procedures Directive, recital 18; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and 
Practice (A UNHCR research project on the application of key provisions of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive in selected Member States 2010); Asylum Information Database, 
Admissibility, Responsibility and Safety in European Asylum Procedures (Comparative 
report, European Council on Refugee and Exiles, 2016) < http://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ECRE-AIDA-Admissibility-responsibility-and-safety-in-
European-asylum-procedures.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017. 
 8 
 
On July 13, 2016, the EU Commission presented a proposal for a 
Regulation on asylum procedures intended to replace the current Recast 
Procedures Directive.8 Beside further harmonising the asylum procedures in 
Member States, one of the main objectives of the proposal is to further 
streamline asylum procedures.9 The proposed way of achieving the 
objective of more streamlined procedures is, among other things, to 
implement shorter time limits and make previously optional procedural 
instruments, such as the ‘safe country’ concepts, mandatory for Member 
States to use.10 Since the Proposal proposes stricter implementation of 
already criticised procedural concepts, it is no surprise that the Proposal has 
been heavily criticised by non-governmental organisations and others.11 
 
This thesis will examine what obligations the principle of non-refoulement 
imposes on EU Member States when handling asylum applications. The 
results of this examination will then be used to assess whether certain key 
articles in the Commission’s Proposal, closely related to the strive to 
streamline asylum procedures, are compatible with the principle of non-
refoulement. 
 
My personal interest in the subject of this thesis was awakened when I, 
during the summer of 2015, worked at the Swedish Migration Agency and 
got the opportunity to see the practical use of accelerated procedures. My 
general interest of states’ obligations towards asylum seekers was revived 
when I, during an internship at the Embassy of Sweden in Copenhagen in 
the autumn of 2016, regularly had to cross the border between Sweden and 
Denmark, and in doing so, every time, was reminded of the efforts taken by 
the Swedish government to hinder asylum seekers from reaching Sweden 
since the carrier sanctions introduced in January the same year required me 
to show my ID card before boarding the train to Sweden.  
1.2 Aim and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to assess whether three specific articles in the EU 
Commission’s Procedures Regulation Proposal are compatible with the 
principle of non-refoulement, and by doing so, contributing to a more 
general discuss on to what extent the principle of non-refoulement restricts 
EU Member States’ possibilities to streamline asylum procedures. The 
examination will focus on some of the provisions most closely related to the 
ambition to streamline asylum procedure, namely, the provisions related to 
admissibility procedures, accelerated procedures and implicit withdrawals of 
asylum applications.  
 
                                                
8 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Common Procedure for International Protection in the Union and Repealing 
Directive 2013/32/EU’ COM(2016) 467 final (Procedures Regulation Proposal).  
9 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 3–5. 
10 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 4–5. 
11 See chapter 2.  
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To reach the aim of the thesis, the following research questions will be 
examined: 
 
1) In what way does the principle of non-refoulement limit the 
possibility for EU Member States to remove an asylum seeker to 
another country without assessing his or her asylum application on 
the merits? 
a. What is the required level of protection that must be available 
in the receiving country? 
b. Are there any procedural obligations that Member States must 
meet when determining if a receiving country is safe for a 
particular asylum seeker? 
2) Does the principle of non-refoulement impose any procedural 
obligations on EU Member States when assessing asylum 
applications on the merits? If so: 
a. What does this/these obligation imply for the use of time limits 
stating the maximum duration of certain procedural steps and 
other procedural requirements imposed on applicants? 
b. What does it imply for the use of procedures stereotyping 
applicants from certain countries?  
3) Considering the answers to the questions 1–2, can it be considered to 
be compatible with the principle of non-refoulement, as proposed in 
the Procedures Regulation Proposal, to use; 
a. admissibility procedures, as proposed in article 36; 
b. accelerated procedures, as proposed in article 40;  
c. implicit withdrawals of applications, as proposed in article 39. 
1.3 General approach, method and 
material 
This thesis is a legal study aimed at finding what legal obligations the 
principle of non-refoulement imposes on EU Member States when dealing 
with asylum applications in order to assess the compatibility of the studied 
articles in the Procedures Regulation Proposal with these obligations.  
 
The study will be based on a positivistic approach to law where law is 
understood as an argumentative discipline.12 Notwithstanding the close 
relationship between morality, politics and law, the starting point of this 
thesis will be that law is an autonomous system that can be analysed as 
such.  
 
To answer the research questions, and reach the aim of this thesis, a 
argumentativist legal dogmatic method will be used.13 The most commonly 
accepted sources of international law, described in section 1.3.1, will be 
studied and interpreted according to the methods of interpretation that will 
                                                
12 Neil Maccormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 14–15. 
13 Álvaro Núñez Vaquero, ’Five Models of Legal Science’ (2013) 19 Revus 
<http://revus.revues.org/2449> accessed May 24 2017, paras 45–51. 
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be discussed in section 1.3.2. In section 1.3.3 some comments will be made 
on specific sources that will be used in this thesis. 
 
The assessment of whether the studied articles in the Procedures Regulation 
Proposal are compatible with the obligations imposed by the principle of 
non-refoulement will be based on the criticism that has been expressed 
towards the Proposal, or towards similar provisions in other legal 
instruments, from, mainly, non-governmental organisations and scholars.14  
1.3.1 Sources of international law 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the ICJ 
Statute) is widely recognised as the most authoritative and comprehensive 
enumeration of the sources of international law.15 The article states the 
following:  
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
A special comment shall be made as to the role of judicial decisions and 
legal doctrine as sources of international law.  
 
In article 38, judicial decisions are explicitly given the role of subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law. Despite their, formally, 
subsidiary position, judicial decisions can be of immense importance 
according to Shaw.16 Taking judicial decisions from the ICJ as an example, 
Shaw holds that the authoritative position of certain judicial decisions, in 
combination with judges of the ICJ sometimes going beyond just 
interpreting the law, gives judicial decisions a position where they are able 
to not merely interpret, but shape the law.17  
 
As regards the status of legal doctrine as a source of international law, it 
offers a method of finding out what the law is rather than classifying as a 
source of actual rules.18 Due to the potential risk of scholars presenting a 
subjectively coloured view, legal doctrine will be used with due regard to 
this risk and will be valued based on the strength of the presented reasoning.   
                                                
14 See chapter 2. 
15 James Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law (8th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 20; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 50; Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in Malcolm 
D Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 92–93.  
16 Shaw (2014) 78. 
17 Shaw (2014) 78. 
18 Shaw (2014) 80. 
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Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute does not present a strict hierarchy of the 
stated sources. However, in practice, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are 
regarded more important than (c) and (d).19 According to Shaw and 
Thirlway, judicial decisions and writings clearly are the lowest ranking 
sources, while general principles come in on a third place since they can 
complement, but never override, customary international law and treaty 
law.20  
1.3.2 Methods of interpretation 
In this section, the methods and rules of interpretation found in international 
law will be examined in order to determine a methodology of interpretation 
that will be used in this thesis. Firstly should be noted, however, that, as the 
International Law Commission (ILC) stated in its 1966 Yearbook, ‘the 
interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.’21  
 
There are in general three basic approaches to treaty interpretation: the 
subjective approach, the objective approach and the teleological approach.22 
The subjective approach looks to the intention of the parties to the treaty, 
whereas the objective approach focuses on the wording and actual meaning 
of the text.23 The teleological approach has a wider perspective and uses the 
objective and purpose of the treaty as a whole to interpret particular 
provisions in the treaty.24 For the ILC the starting point of interpretation was 
the text,25 a method which seems to be preferred also by the ICJ.26 
According to Shaw however, ‘any true interpretation of a treaty in 
international law will have to take into account all aspects of the 
agreement’.27  
 
The rules of treaty interpretation is covered by articles 31–33 in the Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties (VCLT), the content of which is 
considered by the ICJ to reflect customary international law.28 These 
                                                
19 Crawford (2012)  22–23. 
20 Shaw (2014) 87–88; Thirlway (2014) 104–07, 109–10. 
21 International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol 2 
(A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1, United Nations Publication 1967) 218. 
22 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Evans (2014) 
179; Shaw (2014) 675–76. 
23 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Evans (2014) 
179; Shaw (2014) 675–76. 
24 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Evans (2014) 
179; Shaw (2014) 675–76. 
25 International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol 2 
(A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1, United Nations Publication 1967) 218. 
26 Interpretation of Peace Treaties (second phase), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p 
221, 229; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Evans 
(2014) 179. 
27 Shaw (2014) 676. 
28 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyu/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p 6, 
[41]; LaCrand (Germany v United Sfates of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p 466, 
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articles, to some extent, draws on all three of the above mentioned 
interpretations approaches.29  
1.3.2.1 Fundamental rules of interpretation 
The fundamental rules of interpretation are laid down in VCLT article 31 
which states the following: 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
a. Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b. Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
a. Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.  
 
The first paragraph presents the basic rule of treaty interpretation which 
consists of three elements: the text, its context and the object and purpose of 
the treaty.  
 
The principle that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith is, by some 
writers, considered to entail a duty to strive for an interpretation which 
ensures the effectiveness of the treaty.30 The ILC explained the principle of 
effectiveness and its relation to interpretation in god faith in the following 
way: 
 
When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does 
not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and 
purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be adopted.31  
 
In the Territorial dispute case the ICJ called this principle ‘one of the 
fundamental principles of interpretation of treaties’ and, according to Shaw, 
the principle of effectiveness is evident in the context of human rights 
                                                                                                                        
[99], [101]; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p 625, [37].  
29 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’ in Evans (2014) 
179; Shaw (2014) 676. 
30 James c Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 62; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2003) 606. 
31 International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol 2 
(A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1, United Nations Publication 1967) 219. 
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treaties, giving the ECHR as an example.32 The principle of effectiveness is, 
however, not trouble-free. According to Fitzmaurice, ‘The main problem 
with regard to the principle of effectiveness is to keep it within bounds, to 
prevent it from leading to judicial legislation … and to preserve a due 
proportion between it and the textual principle.’33 In regard to this problem, 
the ICJ said in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case that the principle of 
effectiveness, ‘cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions … a 
meaning which … would be contrary to their letter and spirit.’34  
 
Subsequent practice, mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 3, is a 
most important treaty interpretation element as long as the practice is 
consistent and common to, or expressly or tacitly accepted by, all parties to 
the treaty.35 According to Brownlie, also subsequent practise by individual 
parties has ‘some probative value’.36 
 
Finally, paragraph 3 says that attention has to be given to any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. The ICJ 
has said that ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied 
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation.’37 This means that not only norms in force at the time of 
conclusion of the treaty are relevant for the interpretation, but also norms 
that have come into existence later.38  
1.3.2.2 Supplementary means of interpretation 
Supplementary means of interpretation are covered in VCLT article 32, 
which states the following:  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
a. Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
b. Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
 
                                                
32 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyu/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p 6, 
[51]; Shaw (2014) 679–80. 
33 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ’Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1952) 28 The British Yearbook of 
International Law 1, 19. 
34 Interpretation of Peace Treaties (second phase), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p 
221, 229.  
35 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2ed edn, Cambridge University Press 
2007) 241. 
36 Brownlie (2003) 605. 
37 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p 16, [53]. 
38 Hemme Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2006) 19. 
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One commonly discussed means of supplementary interpretation is 
preparatory works39 (travaux préparatoires, or travaux for short).40 In what 
way travaux should be used for interpretation and the weight that should be 
awarded to them is somewhat disputed. Austin and Battjes hold that 
reference to travaux shall only be done, as stated in article 32, to confirm the 
meaning of an interpretation according to article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 is ambiguous, 
obscure, or manifestly absurd or unreasonable, emphasising the risk of 
travaux being incomplete, misleading or outdated due to changed 
circumstances.41 Hathaway, however, argues that the travaux are to be 
treated as a means by which to achieve the interpretive goal set by article 31 
instead of just being used to confirm an already made interpretation and that 
this view has substantial backing of other writers and practice.42 In this 
thesis travaux will take the position proposed by Hathaway but with close 
attention given to the risks put forward by Austin and Battjes.  
 
Preparatory works can, according to several writers, probably be invoked 
against states even if they acceded to the treaty and did not take part in its 
preparation, as long as the travaux has been published or is otherwise 
available.43 
1.3.2.3 Conclusions on method for interpretation 
The interpretation method that will be used in this thesis will be based on 
VCLT articles 31–33, using a combination of the subjective, the objective 
and the teleological approaches where the wording of the text will be 
allowed to set a limit to what interpretations are possible.  
 
Preparatory works will be given the role suggested by Hathaway, not strictly 
as means to confirm an already made interpretation, but as a tool to achieve 
the interpretive goal set by article 31, keeping in mind the potential risk 
involved in using preparatory works for interpretation. 
1.3.3 Material 
The 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the 
Refugee Convention) is, together with the European Convention of Human 
Rights (the ECHR), the most important legal instruments to this thesis.There 
are, however, no international legally binding sources available for 
interpreting the Refugee Convention.44 Documents from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will therefore be used to 
interpret the Refugee Convention in this thesis. The legal value of such 
                                                
39 For a more thorough discussion on what constitutes a preparatory work, see Aust (2007) 
246. 
40 Aust (2007) 244–50; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of 
Treaties’ in Evans (2014) 181–82. 
41 Battjes (2006) 17–18; Aust (2007) 244–45, 247. 
42 Hathaway (2005) 55–59. 
43 Battjes (2006) 17; Aust (2007) 247. 
44 Kees Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement 
(Intersentia 2009) 37. 
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documents is however disputed. Just as regards the position of legal 
doctrine, Battjes holds that UNHCR documents should be regarded as 
subsidiary means of interpretation, the relevance of which depends on the 
quality of its reasoning.45 Kälin, on the other hand, has the view, referring to 
case law from national courts, that States Parties’ duty to cooperate with the 
UNHCR and accept its supervisory role of the Convention implies that 
States Parties have to take into account UNHCR documents, however, 
emphasising that this does not mean that these documents are legally 
binding but that they must be regarded as authoritative statements.46 Since it 
can be considered controversial to rely on the interpretation of national 
courts in the way Kälin does to substantiate his view, a more cautious 
approach will be taken to UNHCR documents in this thesis. UNCHR 
documents will therefore be treated as important subsidiary means of 
interpreting the Refugee Convention. 
 
To interpret the ECHR, case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) will be used. Although only the respondent state is legally bound 
by the final judgement of the Court in a specific case, the judgements are of 
big importance also to other Convention States.47 In Ireland v The United 
Kingdom the Court stated:  
 
The Court's judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before 
the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules 
instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States 
of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties48 
 
The case law of the ECtHR is therefore an important source for analysing 
the obligations imposed on EU Member States by the ECHR. 
1.4 Delimitations 
This thesis will not make a full review of the Procedures Regulation 
Proposal but will focus on the articles regulating the procedural concepts of 
admissibility procedures, accelerated procedures and implicit withdrawals of 
applications, as well as relevant provisions related to these articles. These 
particular articles have been chosen since they are closely related to the 
aspiration to streamline asylum procedures and, due to the criticism that has 
been levelled at theses article,49 should be suitable for highlighting the outer 
boundary of what streamlining efforts are compatible with the principle of 
non-refoulement. A further reason for focusing on these particular articles is 
that the procedural concepts described in these articles, in contrast to other 
parts of the Proposal, are proposed to become mandatory for EU Member 
                                                
45 Battjes (2006) 20. 
46 Walter Kälin, ‘Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: 
Article 35 and Beyond’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee 
Protection in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 625–27. 
47 Wouters (2009) 195. 
48 Ireland v. The United Kingdom App no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 13 December 1977) para 154. 
49 See sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5. 
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States to apply, and therefore, inevitably will have an effect on asylum 
procedures within the EU if the Proposal is adopted.50 
 
Due to the limited scope of this thesis, and the strict focus on the chosen 
articles, the compatibility of the examined articles with the principle of non-
refoulement will only be assessed in relation to obligations imposed on 
Member States when examining asylum applications in first instance. This 
thesis will therefore not examine Member States’ obligations towards 
asylum seekers before an application has been lodged or after a first 
decision has been taken. The assessment will furthermore focus on the parts 
of the chosen articles that can be considered most controversial in relation to 
the principle of non-refoulement.51 The assessment will therefore, in relation 
to the proposed admissibility procedures, focus on the use of ‘safe country’ 
concepts as grounds for declaring an application inadmissible. For the same 
reason this thesis will not examine the possible need of a certain connection 
between an asylum seeker and a safe third country.52 Furthermore, in areas 
where the Procedures Regulation Proposal refers to other EU legal 
instruments, proposed or in force, such as the Dublin Regulation Proposal53 
or the Qualification Regulation Proposal54, no separate examination will be 
done as to the compatibility of these instruments with the principle of non-
refoulement.  
 
The principle of non-refoulement can be derived from several different legal 
sources.55 The examination of what obligations derive from the principle of 
non-refoulement will, due to the limited scope of this thesis, be restricted to 
an examination of that principle as derived from the Refugee Convention 
and article 3 of the ECHR. 
                                                
50 See sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and compare to, for instance, the proposal on border 
procedures: Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 41. 
51 See sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5. 
52 The need for a stronger connection between the asylum seeker and a safe third country 
than the one required by the Procedures Regulation Proposal has been discussed by, for 
instance, the ECRE: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the 
Commission Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 57. This question can however be considered to lie 
outside the scope of the prohibition on refoulement: Stephen H Legomsky, ‘Secondary 
Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning 
of Effective Protection’ (2003) 15 [4] International Journal of Refugee Law 567, 669.  
53 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)’ COM(2016) 270 final. 
54 Commission, ’Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and amending 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents’ COM(2016) 466 final. 
55 See section 3.2. 
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1.5 Previous research 
There has already been substantial research done on the question of what 
obligations the principle of non-refoulement imposes on states.56 The aim of 
this thesis is, however, to include the most recent developments and 
highlight the obligations of specific importance to assess the permissibility 
of measures proposed in the Procedures Regulation Proposal.  
 
Also the Commission’s Proposal has already been scrutinised by non-
governmental organisations and others.57 The criticism levelled at the 
proposal in these studies is however often imprecise and lacks clear legal 
reasoning to back it up.58  
 
This thesis can therefore contribute to the research already done by updating 
and specifying what obligations EU Member States have to meet when 
handling asylum applications and assess, from a stricter legal perspective 
whether the Commission’s Proposal is compatible with these obligations. 
1.6 Outline 
In the second chapter the content of the particular articles that will be 
analysed in this thesis will be examined. By way of introduction, the 
background and aim of the Procedures Regulation Proposal will be 
presented in order to give the reader a better understanding of the proposed 
articles. After having presented the background and aim, the content of the 
provisions related to admissibility procedures, accelerated procedures and 
the implicit withdrawal of asylum applications will be examined one by one. 
To put these proposed provisions in a context they will, where possible, be 
compared to the corresponding provisions in the Recast Procedures 
Directive, which is the instrument currently regulating the asylum procedure 
on EU level. In order to be able to focus the examination in the third chapter 
to the relevant questions, the second chapter will also present the criticism 
that has been levelled at the proposed provisions. 
 
The third chapter will examine what obligations, relevant to the assessment 
of the provisions described in the second chapter, that emanate from the 
prohibition on refoulement as the prohibition is expressed in the Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR. These two instruments will be examined 
individually, starting with the Refugee Convention. The aim of this chapter 
is to give an answer to research questions 1 and 2 presented in section 1.2.  
 
In the fourth chapter the findings of the third chapter will be applied to the 
provisions of the Procedures Regulation Proposal presented in the first 
                                                
56 See for instance: Stephen H Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return 
of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection’ (2003) 15 [4] 
International Journal of Refugee Law 567; Wouters (2009). 
57 See chapter 2.  
58 See chapter 2. 
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chapter in order to make an assessment of the compatibility of the proposed 
provisions with the prohibition on refoulement. 
 
In the fifth and final chapter, the conclusions of this thesis will be 
summarised.  
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2 The Procedures Regulation 
Proposal 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the three articles of the Procedures Regulation 
Proposal that are to be assessed and other relevant provisions of the 
Proposal that are related to those articles. First, the background and aim of 
the Proposal will be described briefly to give the reader a better 
understanding of the Proposal. Thereafter, the provisions relating to the 
articles concerning admissibility procedures, accelerated procedures and the 
implicit withdrawal of asylum applications will be examined. Where 
possible, these provisions will be compared to the corresponding rules in the 
Recast Procedures Directive in order to give a context to the proposed 
changes.  
 
The focus of this chapter will be on the most controversial parts of the 
studied proposals. To make it clear to the reader why certain proposals can 
be considered controversial, the criticism that has been, or possibly can be, 
passed on the studied proposals will be presented together with the 
examination of each proposal respectively.  
2.2 Background and aim of the proposal 
Since 1999, the EU has been striving to create a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS).59 The CEAS is made up of several legal instruments 
regulating what Member State is responsible for considering an asylum 
claim (the Dublin Regulation),60 the reception conditions (the Reception 
Directive),61 the asylum procedure (the Recast Procedures Directive) and the 
type of protection conferred and the rights and benefits granted to those 
eligible for protection (the Temporary Protection Directive62 and the 
Qualification Directive63).64  
                                                
59 European Commission, A Common European Asylum System (Information folder, 
Publications Office of the European Union 2014) 3. 
60 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31. 
61 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) 
[2013] OJ L180/96. 
62 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and 
bearing the consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12. 
63 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
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The instrument currently in force, regulating the asylum procedures, is the 
Recast Procedures Directive from 2013 which replaced the 2005 Procedures 
Directive.  
 
On July 13, 2016, the European Commission presented four proposals for 
changes to the CEAS: a proposal for a Regulation to replace the excising 
Recast Procedures Directive,65 a proposal for a Regulation to replace the 
Qualification Directive,66 a proposal revising the Reception Directive67 and 
a proposal for a Union resettlement framework68. 
 
The aim of the Commission’s Procedures Regulation Proposal is, according 
to the Proposal, to ‘establish a truly common procedure for international 
protection which is efficient, fair and balanced.’69 This aim can be seen as 
entailing two separate, but related, parts: the strive to harmonise the 
procedures within the EU, and the strive to make the procedures efficient 
and fair.   
 
To achieve a higher degree of harmonisation of the asylum procedures 
among Member States, with the primary aim of removing initiatives for, 
what the commission calls, ‘asylum shopping’ and secondary movements 
between Member States, the Commission wants to replace the Recast 
Procedures Directive with a regulation, directly applicable in the Member 
States,70 and remove the possibility for states to choose whether to use 
certain procedural arrangements or not.71  
 
                                                                                                                        
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) 
[2011] OJ L337/9. 
64 Céline Bauloz and others, ’Introducing the Second Phase of the Common European 
Asylum System’ in Céline Bauloz and others (eds), Seeking Asylum in the European 
Union: Selected Protection Issues Raised by the Second Phase of the Common European 
Asylum System (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 4. 
65 Procedures Regulation Proposal.  
66 Commission, ’Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and amending 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents’ COM(2016) 466 final. 
67 Commission, ’Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast)’ 
COM(2016) 465 final. 
68 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 
516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council’ COM(2016) 467 final.  
69 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 3. 
70 According to article 288 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 a Regulation is binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States while a Directive only is binding as to the result to be 
achieved.  
71 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 3–4. 
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To achieve the goal of efficiency the Commission wants to see ‘short but 
reasonable’ time limits, stricter rules to prevent ‘abuse of the system’ and 
harmonised rules on safe countries.72 Furthermore, several procedural 
arrangement relating to efficiency that today are voluntary for Member 
States to use are proposed to become obligatory.73 To make sure that asylum 
claims are adequately assessed the Commission proposes, among other 
things, to strengthen the right to be heard in a personal interview and the 
access to free legal assistance and representation.74 The aim of the 
Commission is that these measures will promote ‘quick but solid decisions, 
so that persons who are in need of protection get their status recognised 
quickly while swiftly returning those not in need of protection.’75 
 
There are currently no less than seven possible procedural tracks in EU law 
for assessing asylum applications: a ‘regular’ procedure,76 a prioritised 
procedure,77 an accelerated procedure,78 an admissibility procedure,79 a 
Dublin procedure80 and a border procedure81. Only the regular procedure 
and the Dublin procedure are obligatory for Member States to use.82 The 
others may, according to the wording of the articles, be used if the Member 
State wishes to do so.  
 
In the Procedures Regulation Proposal, the Commission proposes to make 
also the accelerated procedure and the admissibility procedure compulsory 
for Member States to utilise.83 In addition to making these procedural 
concepts obligatory, the Commission proposes certain changes to the 
content of these provisions. The Procedures Regulation Proposal also 
introduces changed rules on when an asylum application should be 
considered implicitly withdrawn and the effect of such a withdrawal. These 
proposals will be described more closely in the following sections. 
                                                
72 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 3–5. 
73 E.g. accelerated procedures (compare article 31(8) Recast Procedures directive and 
article 40 Procedures Regulation Proposal) and inadmissibility proceedings (compare 
article 33 Recast Procedures Directive and article 36 Procedures Regulation Proposal). 
74 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 4. 
75 Procedures Regulation Proposal, 4. 
76 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31(1). 
77 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31(7). 
78 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31(8). 
79 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33. 
80 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31. 
81 Recast Procedures Directive, art 43. 
82 See the wording of Recast Procedures Directive art 31(1) ’Member States shall’ and 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31, 
art 20(1). 
83 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 41.  
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2.3 Admissibility procedures 
According to the current EU law, Member States are not required to 
examine whether an applicant qualifies for international protection if the 
application is considered inadmissible.84 This means that an asylum seeker 
who’s application is considered inadmissible can be removed to another 
country without getting his or her application for international protection 
assessed on its merits.  
 
The Recast Procedures Directive presents an exhaustive list of five grounds 
on which an application may be considered inadmissible.85 An application 
may be considered inadmissible if the applicant:  
 
a) has been granted international protection by another member state;  
b) comes from a ‘first country of asylum’;  
c) comes from a ‘safe third country’;  
d) makes a subsequent application with no new elements;  
e) is a dependent of an applicant and makes a separate application 
without justification.86 
 
Under the current legislation, each Member State is not only free to choose 
whether to use admissibility procedures or not, but the Member States can 
also choose what inadmissibility grounds to recognise.87 Due to this 
freedom, procedures on admissibility vary greatly between national 
legislations of Member States, ranging from Sweden, not having any 
admissibility procedure at all, to countries such as Cyprus, Greece and 
Malta recognizing all admissibility grounds presented in the Directive.88  
 
In the Commission’s proposal the admissibility procedure, with all its 
current inadmissibility grounds, are proposed to become an obligatory part 
of asylum procedures in all Member States.89 This means that a Member 
State will be obliged to declare an application as inadmissible if any of the 
grounds apply.90 The only exception to this obligation is if the Member 
State prima facie considers that an application may be rejected as manifestly 
unfounded.91 
 
                                                
84 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33(1). 
85 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33(2). 
86 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33(2). 
87 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33(2). 
88 Asylum Information Database, Admissibility, Responsibility and Safety in European 
Asylum Procedures (Comparative report, European Council on Refugee and Exiles, 2016) 
< http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ECRE-AIDA-Admissibility-
responsibility-and-safety-in-European-asylum-procedures.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017, 
15–16. 
89 Note however that the ground related to the applicant having been granted international 
protection by another Member State in the proposal is moved to the Dublin Regulation: 
Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 36(1–2).  
90 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 36(1–2). 
91 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 36(5). 
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The Recast Procedures Directive does not set out any time limits for the 
duration of an admissibility procedure.92 In the Commission’s proposal the 
time limit for examining the admissibility of an application is set to one 
month, or ten working days if the concept of ‘first country of asylum’ or 
‘safe third country’ is applied.93  
 
According to Amnesty International, the proposed time limit for the 
duration of the admissibility procedure connected to the concepts of ‘first 
country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ of only ten days, raises concerns 
as it ‘may not offer applicants an effective opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of safety in individual circumstances and will deny asylum-
seekers access to asylum in Europe.’94   
 
The concepts of ‘first country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ are, in 
general, the admissibility grounds that has been the primary focus of 
discussion and criticism by organisations and scholars.95 The following 
sections will therefore examine these two admissibility grounds in more 
detail.  
2.3.1 First country of asylum 
According to article 35 of the Recast Procedures Directive, a country can be 
considered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant if the 
applicant has been recognised as a refugee in that country and he or she still 
can avail himself or herself of that protection, or if he or she ‘otherwise 
enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefitting from the 
principle of non-refoulement’. A basic requirement for considering a 
country as a first country of asylum is also, according to the article, that the 
applicant will be readmitted to that country. 
 
In some aspects, the Procedures Regulation Proposal proposes a 
strengthening of the protection of the asylum seeker under the first country 
of asylum concept. The Commission proposes that an applicant only should 
be considered to enjoy sufficient protection if: 
 
                                                
92 Recast Procedures Directive, art 33. 
93 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 34(1). 
94 Amnesty International, The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 
2017) <http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017, 6. 
95 See for instance Stephen H Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return 
of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection’ (2003) 15 [4] 
International Journal of Refugee Law 567; Asylum Information Database, Admissibility, 
Responsibility and Safety in European Asylum Procedures (Comparative report, European 
Council on Refugee and Exiles, 2016) < http://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ECRE-AIDA-Admissibility-responsibility-and-safety-in-
European-asylum-procedures.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017, 16–22; Amnesty International, 
The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 2017) 
<http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017. 
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a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;   
b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Regulation (EU) No XXX/XXX 
(Qualification Regulation);   
c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is 
respected;   
d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law is 
respected;96   
 
These criteria are currently optional for Member States to apply to the first 
country of asylum concept.97 The Procedures Regulation Proposal also 
introduces criteria for some basic socio-economic rights to the concept of 
‘sufficient protection’.98 
 
While raising the threshold for when an applicant is to be considered to have 
access to ‘sufficient protection’, the Procedures Regulation Proposal lowers 
the threshold of the other ground for considering a country to be a first 
country of asylum. In the Recast Procedures Directive, an applicant has to 
be recognised as a refugee in the receiving country in order for that country 
to be considered a first country of asylum.99 In the Procedures Regulation 
Proposal however, it is sufficient that the applicant has enjoyed 'protection 
in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.100 
 
According to both the Recast Procedures Directive and the Procedures 
Regulation proposal an applicant should be given the possibility to 
challenge the application of the ‘first country of asylum’ concept in the light 
of the applicant’s personal circumstances.101 
 
A potential problem with the ‘first country of asylum’ concept is that it may 
lead to the individual risk of removing an asylum seeker to a particular 
country being overlooked, if the concept is implemented in a mechanical 
way.102 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) expresses 
concern that the Proposal only requires an asylum seeker to have enjoyed 
‘protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’103 instead of having 
been recognised as a refugee in the receiving country.104According to the 
                                                
96 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 44(2). 
97 Recast Procedures Directive, art 35. 
98 These criteria include appropriate access to the labour market, reception facilities, 
healthcare and education and a right to family reunification in accordance with international 
human rights standards: Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 44(2). 
99 Recast Procedures Directive, art 35(a). 
100 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 44(1)(a). 
101 Recast Procedures Directive, art 35; Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 44(3). 
102 Hathaway recognises this risk in relation to shared responsibility systems, such as the 
Dublin system: James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 325. Even if there are differences between the Dublin 
system and the ‘first country of asylum’ concepts the same problem may possibly arise. 
103 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 44(1)(a). 
104 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
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ECRE, the recognition of the asylum seeker as a refugee according to the 
Refugee Convention should be a prerequisite for considering a country to be 
a first country of asylum as it otherwise may result in persons eligible for 
refugee status ‘being effectively barred from accessing their rights’.105 The 
ECRE also expresses concerns about the existence of the notion of 
‘sufficient protection’ all together.106 Even though the notion is proposed to 
be reformulated to offer a stronger protection, the ECRE holds that the 
protection in the receiving country should be required to be at the same level 
as under EU law.107  
2.3.2 Safe third country 
For a country to be considered a safe third country according to the current 
EU legislation, the Member State must be satisfied that the applicant will be 
treated in accordance with the following five principles in that country: 
 
a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;  
b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;  
c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is 
respected;  
d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is 
respected; and  
e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to 
receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.108 
 
The applicant should also be able to challenge the existence of this 
connection and the application of the safe country concept on the ground 
that that the country is not safe for the applicant under his or her particular 
circumstances.109 
 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 52–53. 
105 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 52–53. 
106 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 53. 
107 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 53. 
108 Recast Procedures Directive, art 38(1). In addition to these five principles a certain 
connection between the applicant and the third country is required: Recast Procedures 
Directive, art 38(2)(a). This criterion will however not be assessed in this thesis: see section 
1.4. 
109 Recast Procedures Directive, art 38(2)(c). 
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The Commission has chosen to keep the same five principles of protection, 
however with a change to the last one.110 Instead of the requirement that a 
safe country must provide the possibility for the applicant to request refugee 
status and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention it 
is, according to the proposal, sufficient that the possibility exists to receive 
‘protection in accordance with the substantive standards of the Geneva 
Convention’ or the same level of ‘sufficient protection’ as proposed for the 
first country of asylum concept.111 
 
Another change proposed by the Commission is that the decision of whether 
a country is to be considered a safe third country or not will be taken at 
Union level.112 According to the proposal there will be no possibility for 
Member States to derogate from the common EU-list of safe countries.113 
This means that a Member State must treat a country on the list as a safe 
country. There is however a possibility for the Member State to deem a safe 
country unsafe in the individual case of a particular applicant.114 
 
According to Hathaway, safe third country concepts in general raise 
questions of whether it is permissible for a party to the Refugee Convention 
to consider a non-party state as being a safe third country and what level of 
protection a country must provide in order be considered safe.115 The ECRE 
has similar concerns in relation to the Comission’s Proposal. ECRE 
considers the requirement that the third state must provide ‘protection in 
accordance with the substantive standards of the Geneva Convention’ too 
weak.116 ECRE holds that the uncertainty of what the ‘substantive standards 
of the Refugee Convention’ are, implies that the Refugee Convention can be 
applied by states on a ‘prick-and-chose’ basis in a way that is incompatible 
with the Convention.117 Furthermore, ECRE argues that this, already weak 
protection, is further weakened by the proposal that ‘sufficient protection’ 
should be enough for considering a country safe in the lack of ‘protection in 
accordance with the substantive standards of the Geneva Convention’.118 In 
                                                
110 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 45(1). 
111 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 45(1)(e). 
112 Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 45(2)(b), 46. During a period of five years from 
entry into force of the Regulation Member States are proposed to, with some limitations, be 
able to decide that also other countries than the ones considered safe at Union level shall be 
considered safe at national level: Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 45(2)(a), 50. 
113 Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 45, 46, 49. 
114 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 45(3). 
115 Hathaway (2005) 327–28. 
116 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 55. 
117 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 55. 
118 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 56. 
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the view of the ECRE, the proposed construction of the safe third country 
concept in the Proposal ‘may entail greater risks of the applicant being 
ultimately subjected to serious human rights violations, including 
refoulement, as the outcome and quality of such process is by definition 
unknown.’119 
2.4 Accelerated procedures 
If an application is not considered inadmissible, the Member State must 
generally conduct a substantive examination of the applicant’s claim for 
asylum to conclude whether the applicant should be granted international 
protection or not.120 This examination can be done in different ways.121 
Under the current EU legislation there are ten different situations in which a 
Member State may choose to accelerate the examination of an 
application.122 In contrast to the admissibility procedure, the accelerated 
procedure allows for a substantive examination of the applicants asylum 
claims, but in a procedure that allows for shorter time limits on certain 
procedural steps in comparison to a regular asylum procedure.123 In the 
commission’s proposal the grounds for accelerating an examination are 
reduced to the following eight grounds: 
 
a) the applicant has only presented facts irrelevant for international 
protection; 
b) the claim of the applicant is clearly unconvincing;  
c) the applicant has misled the authorities; 
d) the applicant is making an application merely to delay or frustrate 
the enforcement of a decision to remove the applicant from a 
Member State; 
e) a third country may be considered a safe country of origin; 
f) the applicant does not comply with certain obligations in the Dublin 
Regulation; 
g) the application is a subsequent application with no tangible prospect 
of success. 124  
 
Just as in the case of the admissibility procedures, the Commission wants to 
make the accelerated procedures, together whit its grounds for application, 
mandatory for Member States to use.125 
                                                
119 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 56. 
120 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31; Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 36, 37. One 
exception can be if the application is considered implicitly withdrawn: see section 2.5. 
121 The examination procedure can either be ’regular’ or accelerated: Recast Procedures 
Directive, art 31. 
122 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31(8). 
123 Recast Procedures Directive, recital 20, art 31(8). 
124 This is a summary of ground presented in article 40, not a quotation of that article: 
Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 40(1). 
125 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 40(1). 
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Under the current EU legislation, it is up to each Member State to lay down 
its own time limits for the duration of an accelerated procedure. The only 
requirement imposed by the Recast Procedures Directive is that such time 
limits must be ‘reasonable’.126 In the Commission’s Proposal, the time limit 
for an accelerated procedure is set to two months or eight working days if 
the examination is accelerated because the application was made ‘merely to 
delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision 
resulting in his or her removal from the territory of a Member State’.127 If 
the determining authority considers that a certain case is too complex to be 
examined under an accelerated procedure it may continue the examination 
under a ‘regular’ procedure.128 
 
The ECRE holds that the use of accelerated procedures, as they are currently 
being used in some countries, entails a risk of compromising fundamental 
rights of applicants by making a fair and qualitative examination of 
applicants’ need for international protection close to impossible through the 
use of time limits giving applicants insufficient time to prepare their 
applications or appeals. 129 The ECRE therefore argues that accelerated 
procedures only should be used in cases where the application is clearly 
fraudulent or the applicant only has submitted issues that are unrelated to 
the grounds for granting international protection.130 On this basis, the ECRE 
considers, for instance, the proposal to accelerate the examination of 
applications that has not been filed by the applicant in the first country 
where he or she illegally entered the EU, unjustified as the place where the 
applications has been filed is completely unrelated to the applicants claim 
for international protection.131 Also Amnesty International criticise the use 
of grounds for acceleration based on elements or behaviours that have no 
connection to the validity or merit of the application.132 
 
In the same way as regards the grounds for the admissibility procedure 
presented above, the, generally, most frequently discussed ground for 
                                                
126 Recast Procedures Directive, art 31(9). 
127 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 40(1–2). 
128 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 40(4). 
129 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 47. 
130 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 47. 
131 This acceleration ground is included in the above mentioned point f. European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission Proposal for an Asylum 
Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < http://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 
May 2017, 47–48.  
132 Amnesty International, The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 
2017) < http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017, 5. 
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acceleration is the one connected to the concept of ‘safe countries’, the ‘safe 
country of origin’ concept.133 The following section will therefore describe 
this particular ground more thoroughly. 
2.4.1 Safe country of origin 
According to annex I and article 37(1) of the Recast Procedures Directive, a 
Member State may consider a country to be a safe country of origin if: 
 
… it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as 
defined in Article 9 of Directive 2011/95/EU, no torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 
When making the assessment of the safety of a country, the Directive 
prescribes that account shall be taken to, among other things, the extent to 
which protection is provided against persecution or mistreatment by 
observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR, as well as 
respect for the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention.134 In order for a safe country of origin, as defined above, to be 
considered a safe country of origin for a particular applicant, this applicant 
must have the nationality of that country or, if the applicant is a stateless 
person, formerly have been habitually resident in that country.135 Another 
prerequisite is that the applicant has not submitted any serious ground for 
considering the country not to be a safe country of origin for the particular 
applicant.136 
 
The overall construction of the ‘safe country of origin’ concept proposed in 
the Procedures Regulation Proposal reassembles the construction of the 
concept in the current Directive to a great extent.137 There are, however, 
minor, but significant, proposed changes to be found. The formulation in the 
Directive that there ‘generally and consistently’138 should be no persecution, 
torture etc. in a safe country of origin is, in the Proposal, changed to only 
‘generally’139. The obligation in the Directive to observe whether a country 
respects the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention when assessing the safety of a country is rewritten to a general 
description of the principle of non-refoulement which also covers the way 
                                                
133 See for instance Hathaway (2005) 333–35; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
ECRE Comments on the Commission Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation 
COM(2016) 467 (2016) < http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-
Comments-APR_-November-2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 58–62; Amnesty 
International, The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 2017) 
<http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017. 
134 This is only a selection of prescribed factors to take into consideration according to the 
Directive. Recast Procedures Directive, annex I. 
135 Recast Procedures Directive, art 36(1). 
136 Recast Procedures Directive, art 36(1). 
137 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 47. 
138 Recast Procedures Directive, annex I. 
139 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 47(1). 
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the principle is formulated in the ECHR. 140 It does, however, no longer 
make direct reference to the Refugee Convention.141  
 
Similarly to the ‘safe third country’ concept as proposed by the 
Commission,142 the countries to which the ‘safe country of origin’ concept 
is going to be applied are proposed to be decided on Union level.143 This 
means that a Member State, according to the proposal, will be required to 
accelerate the procedure of an application made by an applicant coming 
from a country on the common EU list of safe countries of origin, unless the 
applicant has submitted serious grounds for considering the country not to 
be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances.144 
 
According to the ECRE: 
 
The use of safe country lists … further contributes to a practice of stereotyping 
certain applications on the basis of their nationality and increases the risk of such 
applications not being subject to thorough examination of a person’s fear for 
persecution or risk of serious harm on an individual basis, which is crucial to 
ensuring full respect for the principle of non refoulement.145  
 
The ECRE further argues that the application of a presumption of safety 
puts an almost impenetrable burden of proof on the applicant required to 
rebut this presumption.146  
 
For those reasons the ECRE advocates the complete deletion of the safe 
country of origin concept all together.147 An approach also shared by 
Amnesty International on generally the same grounds.148 
                                                
140 Compare Recast Procedures Directive, annex I and Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 
47(3)(c). 
141 Compare Recast Procedures Directive, annex I and Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 
47(3)(c). 
142 See section 2.3.2. 
143 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 48. EU Member States will have the possibility to 
designate a country as a safe country of origin on a national level for a period of five years 
from entry into force of the Proposal: Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 50. 
144 Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 40(1)(e), 47(4)(c). 
145 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 58. 
146 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 58. 
147 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 58. 
148 Amnesty International, The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 
2017) <http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017, 1–2. 
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2.5 Implicit withdrawals of applications 
If an asylum seeker for instance, fails to respond to requests to provide 
certain information or does not appear for a personal interview and he or she 
can not show that the failure was due to circumstances beyond his or her 
control,  a Member State may, under the current Directive, consider the 
application implicitly withdrawn or abandoned.149 In such a case, the 
Member state shall either discontinue the examination of the application or 
reject the application if the determining authority, after an adequate 
examination of its substance, considers the application to be unfounded.150 
If the examination of the application is discontinued and not rejected, the 
applicant is entitled to request that his or her case should be reopened or to 
make a new application without having it treated as a subsequent 
application, if the applicant reports to the authorities within, at least, nine 
months.151 
 
In the Commission’s Proposal, the possibility for a Member State to 
discontinue the examination of an application, instead of rejecting it, is 
removed.152 Instead the Proposal presents a list of six circumstances which, 
if they occur, puts an obligation the Member State to reject the application 
after having sent a written notice to the applicant, unless the applicant 
contacts the authorities within one month and shows that the reason for the 
occurred situation was beyond his or her control.153 If this is not done the 
Member State shall consider the application implicitly withdrawn and a 
decision shall be taken to definitely reject the application as abandoned or as 
unfounded, where the determining authority has, at the stage that the 
application is implicitly withdrawn, already found that the applicant does 
not qualify for international protection.154 The circumstances on the list are, 
for example, if the applicant refuses to cooperate by not providing his or her 
fingerprints, if the applicant does not show up for a personal interview or if 
the applicant has abandoned his or her place of residence without informing 
the authorities.155  
 
If a new application is made after the first application has been rejected, that 
application will be considered a subsequent application and will only be 
examined on its merits if it contains new elements or findings which the 
applicant was unable, through no fault on his or her own part, to present 
earlier, unless its considered unreasonable not to take those elements or 
findings into account.156  
 
                                                
149 Recast Procedures Directive, art 28(1). 
150 Recast Procedures Directive, art 28(1). 
151 Recast Procedures Directive, art 28(2). 
152 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 39(1). 
153 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 39(1–3). 
154 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 39(4–5). 
155 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 39(1). 
156 Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 4(2)(d), 42(1, 4). 
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The proposed changes would in practice mean, for example, that there no 
longer is room for the applicant to forget an appointment for a personal 
interview without severe consequences. If the applicant cannot show that the 
reason for him or her failing to show up for an interview was beyond his or 
her control, the application will be rejected and the applicant will have to 
lodge a new application which will be treated as a subsequent application. 
 
The ECRE holds that the concept of implicit withdrawals may lead to 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement.157 Also Amnesty 
International sees a risk of the proposed changes leading to refoulement as 
applicants, after having their applications rejected, will have to make a new 
application which will be treated as a subsequent application and, ‘Since, in 
most cases, there will be no new elements for their asylum claim, there is 
the danger that their application will not be examined at all.’158 Similar 
concerns have been expressed by Swedish courts in comments to the 
Proposal.159 The ECRE especially criticise that Member States, according to 
the Proposal, will be obliged to reject an implicitly withdrawn application 
instead of, as currently, also have the possibility to discontinue the 
examination, as this flexibility could be necessary for Member States in 
order to comply with their obligations under international human rights 
law.160  
2.6 Conclusions 
One of the biggest changes in the Procedures Regulation Proposal, 
compared to the Recast Procedures Directive, is that the admissibility 
procedures and the accelerated procedures, together with all proposed 
grounds for inadmissibility and acceleration, such as the ‘safe country 
concepts’, are made mandatory for Member States to use.161 As regards the 
content of the provisions regulating these procedures, there are minor, but 
potentially important, changes proposed. Some of these proposed changes 
                                                
157 ECRE does, however, not specify in what way such a violation could occur: European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission Proposal for an 
Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < http://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 
May 2017, 45. 
158 Amnesty International, The Proposed Asylum Procedures Regulation (Position paper, 
2017) <http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/AI_position_paper_on_APR_proposal.pdf> 
accessed 9 May 2017, 10. 
159 Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Remissyttrande: EU-kommissionens förslag till 
asylprocedurförordning och skyddsgrundsförordning (Comment of official report by the 
administrative court of appeal in Stockholm, Dnr KST 2016/379, KST 2016/388, 2016) 6; 
Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, Remissyttrande: EU-kommissionens förslag till 
asylprocedurförordning (Comment of official report by the administrative court in 
Stockholm, Dnr FST 2016/236-I, 2016) at 3–4. 
160 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation COM(2016) 467 (2016) < 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-
2016-final.pdf > accessed 8 May 2017, 45. 
161 See sections 2.3, 2.4. 
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may increasing the protection of the applicants,162 while others risk lowering 
the protection163. 
 
The Proposal also presents quite radical changes to the concept of 
‘implicitly withdrawn applications’ in the way that Member States, 
according to the proposal, will be obliged to reject applications under certain 
circumstances and treat a new application from the same applicant as a 
subsequent application, where, as a ground rule, only new circumstances 
will be taken into consideration when assessing the applicants claim for 
protection.164  
 
As presented in this chapter, the examined provisions of the Proposal have 
been criticised on several points for potentially not being compatible with 
the principle of non-refoulement. As regards the proposed admissibility 
procedure, the criticism has mainly been focused on the ‘first country of 
asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ concepts. 165 The proposed time limit of ten 
days for the duration of procedures based on these concepts has been 
considered to short but also the requirements for declaring a country to be a 
first country of asylum or a safe third country has been criticised for being 
too low.166  
 
In the case of the accelerated procedures, the main areas of concern have 
been the short time limits and the risk that stereotyping of certain asylum 
seekers under the ‘safe country of origin’ concept may lead to the 
assessment not being sufficiently individualised.167 
 
As regards the concept of ‘implicit withdrawals of applications’, the fear has 
been that this concept may lead to the applicant being deprived of an 
assessment of his or her asylum claims all together.168  
                                                
162 For example the proposal to introduce specific criteria for the concept of ‘sufficient 
protection’: See section 2.3.1. 
163 See for example the proposal to change the requirement that a safe country of origin 
must be ’generally and consistently’ safe, to only having to be ’generally’ safe: See section 
2.4.1. 
164 See section 2.5. 
165 See section 2.3. 
166 See section 2.3. 
167 See section 2.4. 
168 See section 2.5. 
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3 Obligations imposed on EU 
Member States by the principle 
of non-refoulement 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine what obligations, emanating from the principle of 
non-refoulement, EU Member States must meet when handling asylum 
applications. The chapter will not make a complete examination of 
obligations under the principle of non-refoulement but will focus on the 
obligations relevant for assessing the permissibility of the specific 
provisions examined in the previous chapter.169 The conclusions of this 
chapter will make out the base for the assessment of these specific 
provisions in the next chapter.  
 
To assess whether the criticism, presented in chapter 2, of the examined 
provisions is justified, several parts of the principle of non-refoulement have 
to be examined. In regard to assessing the permissibility of the proposed 
admissibility procedure, including the use of ‘first country of asylum’ and 
‘safe third country’ concepts, the main question is in what way the principle 
of non-refoulement limits the possibility for EU Member States to remove 
an asylum seeker to another country without assessing his or her asylum 
application on the merits. As regards the permissibility of the proposed 
accelerated procedure and the concept of ‘implicit withdrawals of 
applications’, the main question is whether the principle of non-refoulement 
impose any procedural obligations on EU Member States when assessing 
asylum applications on the merits. 
 
First, a short, general description of the principle of non-refoulement and its 
background will be made to introduce the reader to the principle. Thereafter, 
starting with the Refugee Convention, the obligations emanating from the 
principle as it is expressed in the Refugee convention and the ECHR will be 
examined respectively. This examination will not only include a discussion 
about the specific obligations but also an examination of who is bound and 
who is protected by the respective legal instrument.  
 
3.2 General description of the principle of 
non-refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement can broadly be described as a prohibition 
to expel or return a refugee to a country where he or she is likely to face 
                                                
169 See section 1.4. 
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persecution or torture.170 The principle of non-refoulement developed 
together with the principle of non-extradition of political offenders in the 
nineteenth century but was first formulated in the 1933 Convention relating 
to the International Status of Refugees. The principle of non-refoulement 
was later recognised in the Refugee Convention, the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
and in a multitude of other international instruments.171 
3.3 Non-refoulement under the Refugee 
Convention 
The prohibition on refoulement is expressed in article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention which states the following: 
 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
3.3.1 Who is bound? 
All EU Member States are bound by article 33 since the Refugee 
Convention allows no reservation to this article and all Member States are 
parties to the Convention.172  
 
According to article 33, it is the ‘Contracting State’ that is bound by the 
obligations of the article. For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to 
observe that the scope of the term ‘Contracting State’ is defined by the law 
on state responsibility.173 
3.3.2 Who is protected? 
The prohibition on refoulement, as expressed in article 33, is only applicable 
to those asylum seekers who meet the conditions in the definition of the 
refugee as formulated in article 1A of the Refugee Convention. This 
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however, does not mean that states are without obligations towards an 
asylum seeker before his or her status as a refugee is determined. The 
declaratory character of the refugee determination implies that a person is a 
refugee in the meaning of the Convention as soon as he or she fulfils the 
criteria, even if the refuge status is not formally determined. The UNHCR 
handbook explains this in the following way, ‘Recognition of his refugee 
status does not … make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does 
not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he 
is a refugee.’174 This means that the rights conferred on refugees by the 
Refugee Convention must be respected by states until and unless a negative 
decision on the asylum seekers refugee status is taken.175 Inversely, this 
means that the Refugee Convention does not confer any rights to an asylum 
seeker once a negative decision on the asylum seekers refugee status has 
been taken. 
 
In article 1A(2) of the Convention, defining the term ‘refugee’, there is a 
dateline, according to which a person can only be determined a refugee as a 
result of events occurring before January 1, 1951, heavily restricting the 
practical use of the Convention today. Through the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees (the 1967 Protocol), however, this dateline was 
removed, making the Convention applicable without any time restriction.176 
All EU Member States are parties to the 1967 Protocol.177 
 
The second paragraph of article 33 presents an exception to the above 
presented personal scope of the prohibition on refoulement, stating that the 
benefit of article 33 may not be claimed by an asylum seeker who poses a 
threat to the country of asylum.  
3.3.3 What conduct is prohibited? 
Article 33 prohibits the Contracting State to ‘expel or return (“ refouler “) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ 
The exact scope of the prohibition is, however, somewhat contested.178  
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In the following subsections, specific parts of the prohibition on refoulement 
will be examined in order to extract what obligations states have to meet in 
order not to breach article 33. 
3.3.3.1 The question of risk 
The question of what risk precludes a state from removing an asylum seeker 
to another country contains two different elements where the meaning of the 
word ‘risk’ differs. One element of the question is what type of miss-
treatment, or nature of the risk, that is required to preclude removal. The 
other element is how likely the materialisation of that risk must be.   
 
As regards the required nature of the risk, the description of the risk 
precluding a state from expelling or returning an asylum seeker in article 33 
has, even though it is not exactly congruent, big similarities to the definition 
of the term ‘refugee’ in article 1A(2).179  
 
According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam the study of travaux and state 
practice leads to the conclusion that the differences in wording between 
article 1A(2) and article 33 are of no practical relevance and that non-
refoulement therefore, in principle, extends to every individual who has 
well-founded fear of persecution.180 The same view is taken by 
Hathaway.181  
 
Also Lauterpacht and Bethlehem agrees that the words ‘where his life or 
freedom would be threatened’ must be interpreted to comprehend ‘well-
founded fear of persecution’, arguing that the internal coherence of the 
Convention depends on the permissibility of that interpretation.182 
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, however, further claims that the scope of the 
prohibition of refoulement in the Refuge Convention has come to extend to, 
not only an asylum seeker who has a well-founded fear of persecution, but 
also an asylum seeker who faces a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, or who faces other threats to life, 
physical integrity, or liberty.183 It is unclear whether Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem mean that the notion of ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ has 
developed to include the above mentioned threats, or if they mean that the 
prohibition on refoulement has a wider scope than the general refugee 
definition. Given the above mentioned arguments in favour of interpreting 
the scope of article 33 as being connected to the scope of article 1A(2), it 
seems reasonable to believe that any development of the refugee definition 
in article 1A(2) should be reflected in the scope of the prohibition of 
refoulement in article 33. Some of the arguments leading Lauterpacht and 
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Bethlehem to their conclusion is that the UNHCR has gotten a broader 
competence as an agency, that the Refugee Convention has an humanitarian 
objective and that various regional human rights document  have a broader 
understanding of what constitutes refoulement.184 Hathaway holds that the 
threats mentioned by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem are ‘likely to fall within 
modern understandings of a risk of “being persecuted,”’ but that their 
argumentation, if understood as arguing for a scope of article 33 that is 
wider than that of article 1A(2), is ‘simply unsustainable as a matter of 
law.’185  
 
The above presented arguments lead to the conclusion that it is most 
reasonable to assume that the nature of the threat required to preclude the 
removal of an asylum seeker is the same as required to qualify as a refugee. 
 
As regards the question of what degree of likelihood of the threat  
materialising that is required to prohibit the removal of an asylum seeker, 
the prevailing position seems to be that that level is the same as is required 
by the refugee definition.186 According to the UNHCR handbook that risk 
needs to be established ‘to a reasonable degree’.187 Another way of phrasing 
the level of risk required is, according to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, that 
there should be a ‘serious risk’.188 In addition, Hathaway holds, drawing 
from the travaux189,  that the risk has to be foreseeable.190  
 
To summarise, article 33 precludes the removal of an asylum seeker to 
another country if there is a serious risk, or a risk that is established to a 
reasonable degree, that the asylum seeker will be persecuted, as that term is 
understood in article 1A(2) and this risk is foreseeable. 
3.3.3.2 The point in time at which a breach occurs 
According to the interpretation of article 33 advocated in the previous 
section, a state commits refoulement if it sends a refugee to a country where 
he or she faces a serious, foreseeable risk of persecution. It is, thus, the act 
of exposing a refugee to the precluded risk that is prohibited which means 
that a state is not in breach of article 33 unless the actual removal of the 
refugee to the place of risk has taken place. The fact that it is the exposure 
of the refugee to a serious risk of persecution that is prohibited also means 
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that the risk does not have to materialise in order for a state to be in breach 
of article 33.  
 
A breach can, possibly, occur also without a serious risk of actual harm if an 
asylum seeker is removed to another country without a fair assessment of 
the risk that he or she may face.191  
3.3.3.3 The removal of an asylum seeker without 
assessing his or her claim for refugee status 
As an asylum seeker is protected by article 33 for as long as no final 
negative decision on the asylum seekers claim for refugee status has been 
taken, it is of great importance to the question of the permissibility of 
removing an asylum seeker to another country whether the asylum seeker 
has gotten his or her claim for refugee status assessed or not. Under the 
admissibility procedure proposed by the Commission, no such assessment 
will be made.192 It is therefore a vital question to this thesis, in what way the 
principle of non-refoulement limits the possibility for EU Member States to 
remove an asylum seeker to another country without assessing his or her 
asylum application on the merits.  
 
The prevailing view is that there is no positive, general obligation for parties 
to the Refugee Convention to grant asylum to refugees but rather a negative 
obligation of not exposing refugees to certain types of harm.193 Because of 
this notion, States Parties are not prohibited to remove an asylum seeker to 
another country if the country, to which the asylum seeker is being 
removed, is safe.194 That being said, the state in which the asylum seeker 
presented his or her request for asylum has and retains the immediate and 
primary refugee protection responsibilities.195 
 
Beside the obviously impermissible act of removing an asylum seeker to a 
place where he or she risks persecution, there is also a prohibition of what is 
called indirect, or chain refoulement, referring to the situation when a 
refugee is removed to a place that is, in itself, safe but where the asylum 
seeker, by different reasons, risks being removed to another place where he 
or she risks facing persecution.196 It is contested whether this prohibition 
rests on the wording of article 33 itself, which prohibits refoulement ‘in any 
manner whatsoever’,197 or exists due to joint state responsibility of wrongful 
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acts198. The mere existence of a prohibition of indirect refoulement is, 
however, fairly uncontroversial.199  
 
The general understanding seems to be that there has to be ‘effective 
protection’ available in the state to which the asylum seeker is going to be 
removed.200 The most obvious element of effective protection is freedom 
from the risk of being persecuted but also the recieving country’s respects 
for the prohibition on direct and indirect refoulement seems 
uncontroversial.201 The exact content of the concept of effective protection 
is, however, not clearly defined.202 Several of the remaining elements of the 
concept must be considered disputed.  
 
According to Hathaway, an interpretation of the Refugee Convention where 
the only requirement on a sending state is to make sure that there is no 
foreseeable risk of direct or indirect refoulement, would be extremely 
difficult to reconcile to the context, object and purpose of the Convention.203 
Hathaway holds that a fair interpretation of article 33 would entail an 
obligation for states to make sure that the receiving state is a party to the 
Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol, and that the receiving state will in 
fact assess the asylum seekers status and honour all relevant Convention and 
other rights.204 This notion is, however, something that, according to 
Hathaway, ‘not even a carefully contextualized reading of the Convention 
can honestly be said to require…’.205 Instead Hathaway advocates an 
interpretation under which the receiving country can be deemed safe only if: 
 
‘…it will respect in practice whatever Convention rights the refugee has already 
acquired by virtue of having come under the jurisdiction or entered the territory of 
a state party to the Refugee Convention, as well as any other international legal 
rights thereby acquired’206 
 
Legomsky expresses a similar view. Based on what he calls ‘the complicity 
principle’, he holds that:  
 
…no country may return a refugee or asylum seeker to a third country knowing 
that the third country will do anything to that person that the sending country 
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would not have been permitted to do itself – regardless whether the third country 
is a party to the 1951 Convention or to any other human rights conventions.207   
 
The responsibility of the country wanting to remove an asylum seeker is, 
however, according to Legomsky, limited in the way that ‘the degree of 
certainty required by the word “knowingly” should vary inversely with the 
importance of the individual right.’208  
 
Although highly reasonable from a de lege ferenda perspective, the legal 
validity of Hathaway’s and Legomsky’s views from a de lege lata 
perspective is probably not uncontroversial. Hathaway’s legal reasoning 
seems to be resting solely on the recognition of object and purpose as means 
for treaty interpretation in VCTL article 31, while Legomsky’s ‘complicity 
principle’, as it is applied to the Refugee Convention, seems to rest, partly, 
just as Hathaway’s view, on treaty interpretation, but also on the 
responsibility imposed on a state assisting another state in the commission 
of a wrongful act, as stated in the International Law Commission’s articles 
on state responsibility209, mainly article 16.210  
 
Legomsky holds, similar to Hathaway,211 that the object and purpose of the 
Refuge Convention would be thwarted if a state ‘…while prohibited from 
violating the Convention provisions directly, were permitted to assist such 
violations by returning refugees to other countries knowing the latter would 
commit the prohibited acts’.212 The relevant question here is what scope 
each right in the Refugee Convention has and what conduct they actually 
prohibit. Taking the right to education in article 22(1) as an example, it says 
that ‘The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as 
is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education.’ National 
courts seem to interpret this as a right only awarded refugees while present 
in a contracting state, irrelevant to the question whether it is permissible to 
remove a refuge to another state. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that 
judicial decisions in national courts on the permissibility of removing 
asylum seekers to third countries seems to focus on the risk of persecution 
and refoulement but not on living conditions.213   
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To further substantiate his claim, Legomsky refers to the scope of the 
principle of non-refoulement:  
 
Just as no one denies that a state violates the Convention by knowingly sending 
someone to a third country that in turn will violate the person's right to non-
refoulement, so too there is no evident basis to dispute that a state violates the 
Convention by knowingly sending someone to a third country that in turn will 
violate other Convention rights.214  
 
A thing to keep in mind, however, when comparing other rights of the 
Refuge Convention to the prohibition of refoulement is that the wide scope 
of the right to non-refoulement, which includes a prohibition of indirect 
refoulement, finds support in the wording of article 33, prohibiting 
refoulement ‘in any manner whatsoever,’ as well as in the trauvax215. When 
comparing the prohibition of refoulement to, for instance, the above 
mentioned right to education, it seems hard to find the same support for 
giving the right to education the same, wide scope as article 33.  
 
What regards state responsibility, the above mentioned article 16 states that 
‘A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so…’. This means that, to impose an obligation on the sending state in 
this context, both the sending and receiving states must be under the same 
obligation, since the failure of the receiving state to comply with its 
obligations under international law is a prerequisite for the application of 
article 16. In the case where the receiving state is not a party to the Refugee 
Convention and does not have the obligation, for instance, to provide 
education to the asylum seeker, the receiving state does not commit a 
wrongful act by not providing education and the sending state can therefore 
not be considered responsible for any wrongful act under article 16. This 
reasoning leads to the paradox, however therefore not necessarily wrong, 
conclusion that parties to the Refugee Convention are under stricter 
obligations when removing a refugee to another country that is also a party 
to the Convention, compared to the removal of a refugee to a non-party 
state.  
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Even though the exact scope of the concept of effective protection is 
contested, there are parts of the concept that can be claimed with greater 
certainty.  
 
One question that is especially important to this thesis is whether there is an 
obligation on the state removing an asylum seeker to make sure that the 
receiving state will provide the asylum seeker with a fair refugee status 
determination. As argued in the next subsection, there are grounds for 
considering a fair determination procedure a prerequisite for not breaching 
article 33 when a state decides to examine the merits of an asylum claim.  
 
Legomsky does, however, not see a fair refugee determination procedure in 
the receiving country as an absolute prerequisite for a permissible removal 
to that country if the country is willing to honour all elements of effective 
protection without a formal refugee determination procedure, arguing that 
actual protection is more important than formalities.216 If the receiving 
country, however, is not willing to do so, a fair determination procedure 
should be considered a prerequisite for effective protection.217   
 
A related question is whether it is permissible for a party to the Refugee 
Convention to remove an asylum seeker to a state which is not a party to the 
convention. It is a common view that a state’s formal ratification of the 
Refugee Convention, in itself, is not sufficient as a ground for considering a 
country to provide effective protection.218 Instead attention has to be given 
to how the convention has been implemented in practice in the specific 
country.219 However, while a state’s ratification of the convention is not 
sufficient for considering that state to provide effective protection the 
prevailing view seem to be that it is not a mandatory condition either. 
According to a 1996 UNHCR position paper the ‘ratification of and 
compliance with the international refugee instruments…’ is one factor to be 
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considered when determining the permissibility of returning an asylum 
seeker to a particular country.220 In other words, UNHCR clearly considers 
the ratification of the Refugee Convention as an important, but not 
obligatory, factor. The position, that international law does not bar returns to 
non-party states, can also be found in the rulings of national courts, such as 
the Australian Full Federal Court which, in a ruling on the permissibility of 
removing an Iraqi national to a safe country without assessing the applicants 
claim for refugee status, stated that ‘…it is not necessary to show that … the 
third country is party to the Convention’.221 Also Legomsky comes to the 
conclusion that:  
 
… international law does not flatly prohibit the return of refugees to third 
countries that are not parties to the 1951 Convention. As long as the country in 
actual practise observes the Convention and otherwise meets all the requirements 
of effective protection…222 
 
Having outlined the parts of the concept of effective protection that are most 
relevant to this thesis, the question remains how to determine whether a 
third state will offer effective protection, making the removal of an asylum 
seeker to that country permissible. According to UNHCR the procedure of 
determining the safety of a third country for a particular asylum seeker must 
be done on an individualised basis.223 Legomsky argues that, since the harm 
of removing an asylum seeker to a third country that lacks effective 
protection, potentially, is as great as when an asylum claim is incorrectly 
denied and the asylum seeker is removed directly to his or her country of 
origin, the same safeguards that are required for the refugee determination 
procedure should be considered to be required for determining the safety of 
a third country.224 Given the validity of the argumentation presented in the 
next section, according to which a fair refugee determination procedure is a 
legal obligation, it should, in the same way, be a legal requirement to 
provide a fair procedure for determining whether a third country should be 
considered safe for a particular asylum seeker since the same arguments 
apply in this situation. If it were to be permissible to remove an asylum 
seeker to a third country without a thorough assessment of the risk of 
refoulement for that particular asylum seeker the effectiveness of article 33 
would be jeopardised.  
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3.3.3.4 Procedural obligations 
As described in the previous section there is generally nothing that prohibits 
a state from removing an asylum seeker to another country without 
assessing his or her claim for refugee status, as long as the country, to which 
the asylum seeker is being removed, is safe. If a state, however, decides to 
assess the asylum application on its merits, the question arises if there are 
any requirements on the procedure, that the state, making the assessment, 
has to meet. 
 
The Refugee Convention nowhere expressly requires a fair refugee status 
determination but a fair determination is, according to Legomsky, an 
essential part of the prohibition on refoulement in article 33 since there is a 
risk that the asylum seeker otherwise will be exposed to refoulement. 225 
Legomsky even holds that the very establishment of a highly unfair refugee 
determination procedure, in itself, is a violation of article 33 since the 
establishment of such a procedure ‘…assures that an unacceptably high 
number of refugees will be returned erroneously to their persecutors.’226  
 
Legomsky’s view implies that a state, which denies an asylum seeker 
refugee status in an unfair asylum procedure, and returns that person to his 
or her country of origin, would breach the prohibition of refoulement even if 
that person de facto faces no threat. This notion seems incompatible with the 
wording of article 33 since the article prohibits the return of refugees to 
places ‘where his life or freedom would be threatened’.  
 
Unfortunately, it is unclear on what ground Legomsky bases his view. 
However, there seems to be at least two possible arguments to support his 
opinion: As described above,227 the removal of an asylum seeker to another 
country is precluded if there is a serious risk of harm. One possible way of 
arguing is, thus, that removing an asylum seeker after an unfair procedure, 
in itself, would constitutes such a serious risk of harm that would amount to 
refoulement. This would, however, probably be considered a flawed 
argumentation. While an unfair procedure raises the risk of the state 
committing refoulement in a larger perspective, it does not create a risk in 
the case of the particular asylum seeker since an unfair determination can 
not, in itself, create a risk that does not already exist. The better argument 
would be, that, given the fundamental character of the prohibition of 
refoulement, an interpretation of article 33 according to the principle of 
effectiveness entails an obligation to provide a fair determination procedure 
since the opposite would jeopardise the efficiency of the provision. The 
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latter argument seems also to be endorsed by Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam.228  
 
The conclusion that article 33 entails an obligation for states to provide a 
fair determination procedure naturally leads to the question of what the 
requirements are for a procedure to be sufficiently fair. The determination 
procedure is not specifically regulated in the Refuge Convention itself but 
the question of fair procedure has been thoroughly discussed by UNHCR 
which has presented a list of elements that they consider should be part of a 
fair procedure.229 It is, however, uncertain whether these elements can be 
said to be required by international law.230 In the view of Goodwin-Gill and 
MacAdam, UNHCR documents, especially mentioning the Executive 
Committee recommendations, provide a practically necessary minimum in 
order for states not to breach international obligations but emphasise that 
procedural rights, nevertheless, ‘…remain very much within the area of 
“choice of means” among States parties to the Convention and Protocol’ and 
that the question, whether a state fulfils its obligations, essentially depends 
on the outcome of the procedure rather than the procedure itself.231  
 
For the described reasons, it is very hard to, with certainty, set up a list of 
specific procedural obligations. The conclusion seems to be that as long as 
the procedure is adequate for an effective implementation of the Refugee 
Convention, the way in which this goal is met is of lesser importance.232 A 
seemingly uncontroversial view is, however, that a fair determination 
procedure requires a case-by-case examination of the individual 
circumstances of each asylum seeker, at least in cases where the result of the 
procedure is a denial of protection.233 Another specific observation, that is 
of special importance to this thesis, is that there is nothing that precludes 
states from adopting formal requirements, such as time limits for lodging an 
application, but the failure of the applicant to fulfil such a requirement 
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should not lead to a request for asylum being excluded from consideration 
as it may lead to refoulement.234   
3.3.4 Conclusions on states’ obligations under 
the Refugee Convention 
Every EU Member state is obliged to respect the prohibition on refoulement 
in the Refugee Convention. However, in order for the Refugee Convention 
to impose any obligation on a state in relation to an asylum seeker, the 
asylum seeker must meet the definition of the refugee in the Convention. 
Due to the declaratory character of the refuge status however, a state must 
presume that an asylum seeker could be a refugee until the opposite has 
been proven in a refugee determination procedure.  
 
According to the examination in this section, an asylum seeker may not be 
removed to a country where he or she faces serious risk of being exposed to 
a threat of persecution.235 There is, however, generally nothing that 
precludes a state from removing an asylum seeker to another state without 
assessing that persons claim for refugee status as long as the country, to 
which the asylum seeker is being moved, is safe.236 Thus, if a state wants to 
remove an asylum seeker to another country without breeching the 
prohibition on refoulement in article 33, that state must first, either make 
sure that the asylum seeker is not a refugee, or make sure that the country, to 
which the state wishes to remove the asylum seeker, is safe for that 
particular asylum seeker. 
 
If a state wants to remove an asylum seeker to a third country without 
assessing his or her refugee status claim, that third state must be able to 
provide effective protection.237 To try to isolate what obligations emanate 
from the concept of effective protection is no easy task since the exact scope 
or the concept is contested.238 Several national courts seem to interpret the 
principle as restricted to its hard core, in the meaning that it only poses an 
obligation on states not to send an asylum seeker to a country where he or 
she will be persecuted or risks being sent to another country where such a 
risk exists, whereas Hathaway and Legomsky, on the other hand, advocate a 
much broader interpretation where effective protection entails also several 
other refugee rights.239  
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While the exact scope of the concept is contested, it is possible to identify 
some elements with fairly high certainty. In order to consider a country to 
provide effective protection for a particular asylum seeker he or she must 
not face a serious risk of persecution in that country.240 The country must 
also respect the prohibition on direct and indirect refoulement.241 Moreover, 
the receiving country must either provide the asylum seeker with a fair 
refugee determination procedure or be willing to honour all elements of 
effective protection without a formal procedure.242 Lastly, it is not a 
prerequisite that the receiving country is a party to the Refugee Convention 
even though the ratification of the convention, according to UNHCR, is a 
factor to take into consideration when determining the safety of a country.243   
 
The assessment, whether a third country offers effective protection for a 
certain asylum seeker, must be made individually with the same procedural 
obligations as a state has to meet when determining an applicants refugee 
status.244 
 
If a state conducts a refugee determination, that procedure must be fair, at 
least to some extent.245 Beside the requirement that the assessment must be 
made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the individual 
circumstances of each application, the legal requirements of a fair procedure 
is hard to specify.246 As long as the determination procedure is effective in 
realising the object and purpose of the Refuge Convention, each state is 
fairly free to choose how to conduct the determination.247 
3.4 Non-refoulement under the ECHR 
One major difference between the prohibition on refoulement in the Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR is that the implementation and application of the 
latter is monitored by a judicial body, namely the ECtHR.248  
 
The prohibition on refoulement in the ECHR is not explicitly stipulated in 
the Convention.249 Instead a principle of non-refoulement has developed, 
primarily emanating from article 3, in the case law of the ECtHR.250  
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In the following sections will be examined who is bound by the prohibition 
on refoulement, who is protected and what conduct is prohibited. 
3.4.1 Who is bound? 
All EU Member States are parties to the ECHR.251 Under article 57 ECHR, 
Contracting States are allowed to make reservations to the convention when 
signing the convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification. No 
such reservation has been made by any EU Member State in regard to article 
3.252  
3.4.2 Who is protected? 
According to article 1 ECHR ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 
I of this Convention.’ This means that the nationality of a potential rights 
holder, as well as the question whether he or she has residence inside or 
outside the territory of the contracting state, is irrelevant.253 Hence, the mere 
presence of an individual within the jurisdiction of a contracting state is 
enough to make the convention applicable to that person. 
 
As mentioned above, in contrast to the principle of non-refoulement as 
expressed in the Refugee Convention, the prohibition of refoulement in the 
ECHR is absolute. According to article 15 no derogation from article 3 is 
permissible even ‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation…’. The absolute character of article 3 has also consistently 
been reaffirmed by the ECtHR.254  
 
In contrast to the Refugee Convention’s article 33(2) the ECHR contains no 
acceptable ground for exclusion.255 In this regards, the ECtHR has 
established that:  
 
the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, 
cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is 
thus wider than that provided by Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees ….256  
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3.4.3 What conduct is prohibited? 
According to ECtHR, it is a matter of well-established law that parties to the 
ECHR has a right, subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry, 
residence and expulsion of aliens and that neither the ECHR, nor its 
protocols contains a right to asylum.257 The removal of an alien can, 
however, under certain circumstances be in breach of article 3.258  
 
Article 3, which is the base of the prohibition on refoulement in the 
ECHR,259 states that, ‘No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’. According to ECtHR case law, the 
nature of the prohibited conduct in relation to article 3 lies in the act of 
exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment.260 In contrast to article 33 
of the Refugee Convention, article 3 of the ECHR does not only prohibit 
refoulement but also prohibits exposure of an individual to the risk of ill-
treatment in the contracting state itself. However, in relation to the 
prohibition on refoulement, the main obligation for contracting states is a 
negative obligation not to forcibly remove an individual to a country where 
there is a risk of subjection to such ill-treatment prohibited by article 3.261 
The obligation not to remove a person to such a country continues for as 
long as the risk remains.262  
3.4.3.1 The question of risk 
It is not easy to say, in general, what type of treatment constitutes ‘torture 
… inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ in article 3 as it depends 
on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.263 The ECtHR often 
does not explicitly examine the nature of the treatment which the applicant 
risks but instead merely establishes that the conditions in the relevant 
country needs to be assessment against the standards of article 3.264 The 
Court has however, on several occasions, held that the ill-treatment must 
attain a minimum level of severity.265 
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When comparing the treatment precluded by the article 3 ECHR with 
treatment precluded by article 33 of the Refugee Convention some parallels 
can be found. In the case Ahmed v Austria the Court attached particular 
weight, when assessing the risk of the applicant in case of an expulsion, to 
the fact that Austria had granted the applicant refugee status.266 The ECtHR 
has, however, on several occasions found the protection in the ECHR to be 
wider than the protection in the Refugee Convention and that an individual, 
thus, can have a risk of such ill-treatment precluded by article 3 ECHR 
without having a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 
Refugee Convention.267 
 
The risk of the materialisation of the precluded ill-treatment must, according 
to Wouters be, ‘a real, personal, foreseeable or likely risk which goes 
beyond a mere possibility but does not need to be certain or highly 
probable.’268 According to Wouters, ‘A real, personal and foreseeable risk 
implies that the risk must be prospective; it must be real, i.e. realistic and 
not fictional; and it must be personal, i.e. it must relate to the individual 
concerned.’269  
3.4.3.2 The point in time at which a breach occurs 
In the same way as regards refoulement under the Refuge Convention, it is 
the act of exposing an individual to the risk of the prohibited treatment, 
rather than the materialisation of that risk, that is prohibited. This is clearly 
stated in the recent ECtHR case of Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary where 
Hungary was found to have breached the prohibition on refoulement in 
article 3 in relation to two Bangladeshi nationals who were removed to 
Serbia, which by Hungary was considered a safe third country.270 At the 
time of the Court’s assessment, the two applicants had already been 
expelled to Serbia.271 Since the applicants had not submitted any complaints 
against how they had been treated in Serbia, the Hungarian government 
argued that no violation of the applicants’ rights under article 3 had 
occurred.272 The Court, however, rejected the argument from the Hungarian 
government holding that when an applicant has already been expelled, the 
relevant question is whether there, at the time of removal from the 
respondent state, existed a real risk that the applicant would be subject to 
treatment proscribed by article 3 in the state to which he or she was 
expelled.273  
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3.4.3.3 Procedural obligations 
According to the ECtHR, a Contracting State has the responsibility to 
rigorously scrutinise an individual’s claim, that his or her removal to 
another country would be in breach of article 3, since article 3 ‘enshrines 
one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society and prohibits in 
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.274 
This includes the responsibility for a state, assessing such a claim, to assess 
the conditions in the receiving country against the standards of article 3, as 
well as, according to Wouters, to actively gather information relevant to the 
claim.275 The requirement on a state conducting the assessment to make a 
thorough examination of the claim is further underlined by the fact that the 
ECtHR, when assessing if a state has breached article 3, takes into 
consideration, not only those facts which were known to the state, but also 
facts that ‘ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of 
the expulsion’.276 
 
The ECtHR has repeatedly explained that the Court, in cases concerning 
expulsion of asylum seekers, does not itself examine the actual asylum 
applications or verify if the Contracting States meet their obligations under 
the Refugee Convention.277 Instead the Court’s main concern is whether 
there are effective guarantees protecting the applicant from arbitrary 
refoulement to the country from which he or she has fled.278 
 
It is a general view of the ECtHR that rights in the ECHR are supposed to 
be practical and effective and not theoretical or illusory.279 This focus on 
efficiency is apparent in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece where 
Greece was alleged of having breached the right to an effective remedy in 
article 13 in conjunction with article 3 because of shortcomings in the Greek 
asylum procedure.280 The ECtHR acknowledged that Greece had a number 
of guarantees, designed to protect asylum seekers from refoulement in its 
national legislation, but that these guarantees were not respected in practise 
and, hence, did not award sufficient protection against refoulement.281 To 
come to this conclusion, the Court, among other things, took note of the 
‘extremely low rate of asylum or subsidiary protection granted by the Greek 
authorities compared with other European Union member States’, although 
underlining that the importance to be attached to statistics varies according 
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to the circumstances.282 Statistics was also used by the ECtHR in T.I. v The 
United Kingdom to assess the applicants argument that a high burden of 
proof in Germany prevented meritorious claims in practice.283 In that case 
the Court said that, ‘The record of Germany in granting large numbers of 
asylum claims gives an indication that the threshold being applied in 
practice is not excessively high.’284 The conclusion is thus, that the ECtHR, 
when assessing if the asylum procedures of a Contracting State’s offers 
effective guarantees against arbitrary refoulement, takes into consideration, 
among other things, the historical outcome of the procedures in practise. 
 
Beside the obligations on Contracting States to examine an asylum seekers 
claim rigorously and provide effective guarantees from arbitrary 
refoulement, there is case law also indicating the existence of a negative 
obligation not to impose procedural requirements on individuals that hinder 
them from claiming protection against refoulement or substantiating such a 
claim. One type of procedural requirement discussed by the ECtHR on 
several occasions is time limits. In the case of Bahaddar v The Netherlands 
the ECtHR said that an applicant, normally, has the obligation to comply 
with formal requirements and time limits laid down in national law as these 
are designed to ‘enable the national jurisdiction to discharge their caseload 
in an orderly manner’, even in cases where there is an alleged risk of ill-
treatment contrary to article 3.285 The Court added, however, that there are 
situations, depending on the facts of each case, under which an applicant 
cannot be considered obliged to comply with such rules.286 In this regard the 
Court emphasised that:  
 
in applications for recognition of refugee status it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the person concerned to supply evidence within a short time, 
especially if … such evidence must be obtained from the country from which he or 
she claims to have fled.287  
 
Bearing this in mind, the Court said that, ‘time-limits should not be so short, 
or applied so inflexibly, as to deny an applicant for recognition of refugee 
status a realistic opportunity to prove his or her claim.’288 In the case of 
Jabari v Turkey, where an Iranian woman who’s application for asylum was 
rejected since it had not been submitted in compliance with the national 
legislation, requiring an application for asylum to be submitted within five 
days of arrival in Turkey, the ECtHR established that: 
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the automatic and mechanical application of such a short time-limit for submitting 
an asylum application must be considered at variance with the protection of the 
fundamental value embodied in Article 3 of the Convention.289  
 
In K.R.S. v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR made clear that this was a 
principle applicable to all procedural requirements, although adding, that it 
in principle is ‘acceptable for Contracting States to set procedural 
requirements for the submission and consideration of asylum claims …’ as 
long as article 3 is respected.290 
3.4.3.4 The prohibition on indirect refoulement 
Just as in the Refugee Convention, the prohibition on refoulement in the 
ECHR does not only prohibit the removal of a person directly to a country 
where there is a risk of ill-treatment, but also the removal of a person to a 
third country from which he or she risks being transferred to a country 
where such a risk exists.291 As explained above, this is called indirect or 
chain refoulement.292 
 
According to Wouters, the risk of chain refoulement includes two elements 
of risk293. First, there is the real risk of such ill-treatment proscribed by 
article 3 in the final country of destination.294 Secondly, there is the risk that 
the country, to which the person is going to be removed, will, in its turn, 
remove the person to the country where the risk of ill-treatment exists.295 In 
T.I v the United Kingdom, where the question was whether it was 
permissible to return an asylum seeker, a Sri Lankan national, from United 
Kingdom to Germany under the Dublin Convention, the ECtHR assessed 
the risk of Germany returning the applicant to Sri Lanka in two ways after 
having concluded that the applicant actually could face a risk if returned to 
Sri Lanka.296 As a first step, the court examined whether there existed 
safeguards in Germany that, theoretically, would protect the applicant from 
being removed to Sri Lanka.297 The Court then proceeded to assess if these 
safeguards would be effective in practice, taking into consideration the way 
in which the procedural safeguards previously had been applied in and the 
individual circumstances of the applicant.298 According to Wouters, the 
ECtHR adopted a relatively low standard of protection on chain refoulement 
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as the Court found it sufficient that the applicant could receive protection 
based on a provision in German law that gave the discretionary powers to 
German authorities to suspend the removal of aliens that faced substantial 
dangers to the life, personal integrity or liberty.299    
 
The same general method for assessing the risk of indirect refoulement 
presented in T.I. v The United Kingdom was used in M.S.S. v Belgium and 
Greece to assess the alleged violation of article 3 by Belgium for exposing 
the applicant to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the asylum 
procedure in Greece.300 In reply to the argument of the Belgian authorities 
that they had sought sufficient assurances from the Greek authorities that 
they would honour their obligations under the ECHR the Court observed 
that: 
 
the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present 
case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the 
authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention ….301  
 
 
In the recent case of Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, where two Bangladeshi 
nationals were removed from Hungary to Serbia on the notion of Serbia 
being a safe third country, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
Hungarian authorities had not sufficiently examined the individual risk of 
the applicants facing ill-treatment in a chain refoulement situation 
eventually driving the applicants to Greece.302 The Court stated that even if 
the burden of proof lies on the applicants for showing that they face a risk of 
ill-treatment if removed to a country considered safe, the domestic 
authorities have an obligation to assess that risk of their own motion when 
information about such a risk is ascertainable from a wide number of 
sources.303 This, and other circumstances, led the Court to the conclusion 
that Hungary had breached article 3 since the Hungarian authorities had:  
 
relied on a schematic reference to the Government’s list of safe third countries …, 
disregarded the country reports and other evidence submitted by the applicants and 
imposed an unfair and excessive burden of proof on them304  
3.4.4 Conclusions on states’ obligations under 
                                                
299 See The court’s assessment of the position of the applicant as a failed asylum-seeker if 
returned to Germany: TI v UK App no 43844/98 (ECtHR, 7 March 2000) 17–18; Wouters 
(2009) 320–21. 
300 After having concluded that the applicant could arguably claim that his removal to 
Afghanistan would violate Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention the ECtHR proceeded to 
assess whether the Belgian authorities should have foreseen that the Greek authorities 
would not respect their international obligations in asylum matters: MSS v Belgium and 
Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) paras 344–345. 
301 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) paras 353. 
302 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR, 14 March 017) para 118. 
303 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR, 14 March 017) para 118. 
304 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary App no 47287/15 (ECtHR, 14 March 017) paras 124–125. 
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the ECHR 
Every EU Member State is required to respect the prohibition on 
refoulement in the ECHR.305 The prohibition on refoulement in the ECHR is 
not explicitly stipulated in the Convention but has developed, primarily 
emanating from article 3, in the case law of the ECtHR.306  
 
In contrast to the refugee Convention, Contracting States do not only have 
to respect non-refoulement in relation to refugees but to every individual 
within the jurisdiction of the Contracting State.307 A Contracting State must 
therefore protect an individual from refoulement even if that person cannot 
be considered to be a refugee.  
 
The ECHR does not place an obligation on Contracting States to grant an 
asylum seeker asylum but the prohibition on refoulement in the Convention 
does, however, oblige a Contracting State not to forcibly remove an 
individual to another country where he or she faces a real risk of such ill-
treatment prohibited by article 3 of the Convention.308 Article 3 prohibits 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is, however, hard 
to define exactly what treatment is precluded by the article.309 The 
recognition of an asylum seeker as a refugee can be of importance when 
assessing the risk of treatment prohibited by article 3. The opposite, that an 
asylum seeker has been found not to be a refugee, is, however, not decisive 
for whether he or she risks treatment proscribed by article 3 since an 
individual can have a risk of such ill-treatment precluded by article 3 ECHR 
without having a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 
Refugee Convention.310 
 
The prohibition on refoulement in the Convention puts an obligation on 
Contracting States to provide effective guarantees against arbitrary 
refoulement.311 This includes an obligation to undertake a rigorous scrutiny 
of a claim that a removal of an individual would result in refoulement, 
including a responsibility to actively gather relevant information.312 The 
state must also provide effective safeguards.313  
 
Beside these positive obligations, Contracting States also have the negative 
obligation of not introducing procedural requirements on individuals that 
hinder them from claiming protection against refoulement or substantiating 
their claims, such as too short time limits.314 
 
                                                
305 See section 3.4.1. 
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307 See section 3.4.2. 
308 See sections 3.4.3, 3.4.3.1. 
309 See section 3.4.3.1. 
310 See section 3.4.3.1. 
311 See section 3.4.3.3. 
312 See section 3.4.3.3. 
313 See section 3.4.3.3. 
314 See section 3.4.3.3. 
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Just as the prohibition on refoulement in the Refugee Convention, the 
ECHR prohibits indirect, or chain refoulement.315 If an individual faces a 
real risk of proscribed ill-treatment in a country, a Contracting State must 
therefore make sure that the country, to which the Contracting State wishes 
to remove the individual, has safeguards that can protect the individual from 
being removed to the place where he or she faces a risk.316 These safeguards 
must be effective in practice for the particular individual in order to be 
considered ensuring sufficient protection.317  
 
If a Contracting State uses a list of safe third countries, the State may not 
rely on a schematic reference to such a list and may not impose an unfair 
and excessive burden of proof on the individual.   
3.5 Combined conclusions in regard to 
research questions 1 and 2 
This section will discuss what combined conclusions can be drawn from the 
examination of the principle of non-refoulement as the principle is 
expressed in article 33 of the Refugee Convention and article 3 of the ECHR 
in relation to research questions 1 and 2 in this thesis. 
 
The questions to be discussed are: 
 
1) In what way does the principle of non-refoulement limit the 
possibility for EU Member States to remove an asylum seeker to 
another country without assessing his or her asylum application on 
the merits? 
a. What is the required level of protection that must be available 
in the receiving country? 
b. Are there any procedural obligations that Member States must 
meet when determining if a receiving country is safe for a 
particular asylum seeker? 
2) Does the principle of non-refoulement impose any procedural 
obligations on EU Member States when assessing asylum 
applications on the merits? If so: 
a. What does this/these obligation imply for the use of time limits 
stating the maximum duration of certain procedural steps and 
other procedural requirements imposed on applicants? 
b. What does this/these obligation imply for the use of 
procedures stereotyping applicants from certain countries?  
3.5.1 Research question 1 
The differences in scope regarding who is protected by the Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR respectively, leads to a somewhat different way 
                                                
315 See section 3.4.3.4. 
316 See section 3.4.3.4. 
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of approaching the question of what obligations a state must meet when 
wanting to remove an asylum seeker to another country without assessing 
his or her asylum application on the merits. While the protection of the 
Refugee Convention is dependent on the asylum seeker not having received 
a negative decision on his or her claim for refugee status, the protection of 
the ECHR shall be given to anyone within the jurisdiction of a Convention 
State, irrespective of that individual’s status as a refugee.318  
 
The common view is that States Parties to the Refugee Convention must 
make sure that the state, receiving an asylum seeker who has not yet been 
determined not to be a refugee, will offer that asylum seeker effective 
protection.319 The content of the notion of ‘effective protection’ is however 
contested. Some scholars consider the notion to prohibit parties to the 
refugee convention from removing an asylum seeker to another country 
unless that country will give the asylum seeker the same rights as he or she 
has in the sending state, such as a right to education, while national courts 
seem to focus on the absence of a risk of persecution or indirect 
refoulement.320  
 
As regards the prohibition on refoulement in the ECHR on the other hand, 
the required level of protection is the same, irrespective of whether a refuge 
determination has been made or not.321 Judging from the studied ECtHR 
cases, the prohibition on refoulement in the ECHR focuses on not exposing 
the individual to a real risk of ill-treatment.322  
3.5.1.1 Research question 1(a)  
According to the notion of ‘effective protection’ as derived from the 
Refugee Convention, an EU Member State must, before it sends an asylum 
seeker to another state, at least make sure that: 
 
• The asylum seeker will not face a serious risk of persecution in the 
receiving country.323 
• The receiving country will respect the prohibition on direct and 
indirect refoulement.324 
• The receiving country will provide the asylum seeker with a fair 
refugee determination procedure or be willing to honour all elements 
of effective protection without a formal refugee determination 
procedure.325 
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Beside these criteria, there are other, more far-reaching, criteria proposed by 
some scholars, which however must be considered contested.326  
 
According to the ECHR, an EU Member State must also make sure that: 
 
• The asylum seeker will not face a real risk of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country.327 
• The receiving country has effective safeguards against direct and 
indirect refoulement.328 
 
It is important to observe that the personal scope, as well as the scope of the 
treatment prohibited by the principle of non-refoulement differs between the 
two instruments.329 It is thus, for instance, not sufficient to make sure that 
the receiving country will respect the prohibition on refoulement as it is 
expressed in the Refugee Convention to avoid the risk of breaching the 
prohibition on indirect refoulement in the ECHR.  
3.5.1.2 Research question 1(b) 
From the point of view of the Refugee Convention, the same procedural 
obligations have to be met when examining the safety of a third country as 
when examining an asylum seekers claim for refugee status.330 There is also 
no sign of procedural obligations differing between cases concerning 
removal of asylum seekers to, for example, a country considered to be a safe 
third country and removal in other situations according to the case law of 
the ECtHR.331 The answer to research question 1(b) is thus the same the 
answer to research question 2. These questions will therefore be discussed 
jointly in the next section. 
3.5.2 Research question 2 
The Refugee Convention can be considered to require EU Member States to 
provide asylum seekers with a fair refugee determination procedure.332 The 
question of what specific obligations a fair procedure imply is however hard 
to tell as the decisive factor of whether the procedure is fair or not is the 
outcome of the procedure rather than the procedure itself.333 As long as the 
procedure is adequate for effectively implementing the Convention, the 
content of the procedure is of lesser importance.334  
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As regards procedural obligations deriving from the ECHR, EU Member 
States have an obligation to rigorously scrutinise an individual’s claim that 
his or her removal to another country would be in breach of article 3 and 
make sure that there are effective guarantees protecting the applicant from 
arbitrary refoulement to the country from which he or she has fled.335 When 
assessing whether a specific procedure offers effective guarantees, the 
ECtHR takes into consideration, among other things, the historical outcome 
of the procedures in practise.336  
3.5.2.1 Research question 2(a) 
According to the UNHCR, the Refugee Convention does not preclude EU 
Member States from imposing procedural requirements on applicants, such 
as time limits, as long as the failure of the applicant to fulfil such 
requirements does not lead to the request for asylum being excluded from 
consideration.337 The same view can be seen in the ECtHR case law. The 
Court has made clear that it in principle is ‘acceptable for Contracting States 
to set procedural requirements for the submission and consideration of 
asylum claims …’ as long as these requirements does not hinder applicants 
from claiming protection against refoulement or substantiating such a 
claim.338 
 
Short, inflexible time limits, stating the maximum duration of a procedure, 
can be problematic in, at least, two ways. Firstly, such time limits can make 
it hard, or impossible, for an applicant to substantiate his or her claim, for 
example, if the applicant need to gather evidence from abroad. Secondly, 
short time limits may put an undue pressure on the authorities to conclude a 
procedure even if the case has not been thoroughly examined which would 
be in breach of the obligation to rigorously scrutinise the applicant’s claim. 
 
Having concluded that time limits, and other procedural requirements on 
applicants, can be precluded for EU Member States to use, it is hard to 
further say under exactly what circumstances such requirements are 
prohibited. ECtHR has said that the situations, in which an applicant is not 
obliged to comply with such rules, depend on the facts of each case.339 This 
will depend on, for example, how much time the applicant needs to collect 
evidence for his or her claim in the specific case.340 As regards time limits in 
relation to the obligation of Member States to rigorously scrutinise each 
claim, the exact amount of time that can be considered enough for a 
thorough examination will necessarily depend on the complexity of each 
specific case and what resources the authorities have to undertake the 
examination.  
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3.5.2.2 Research question 2(b) 
It is a pretty uncontroversial view that the Refugee Convention requires the 
refugee determination procedure to be made on a case-by-case basis 
assessing the individual circumstances of each applicant.341 The same view 
can be found in relation to the ECHR in the case law of the ECtHR.342 The 
usage of ‘safe country’ concepts involve stereotyping of certain asylum 
seekers as the concept is used to presume that applicants granted protection 
in another country, having had the possibility to apply for protection in 
certain countries or origination from certain countries are presumed not to 
have grounds for protection. While the ‘safe country’ concepts are not 
necessarily incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement they may not 
be used in such a way that they undermine the individual assessment of each 
asylum seekers claim or put an unfair and excessive burden of proof on the 
applicant.343  
 
As earlier established, it is the result of the procedure rather than the 
procedure itself that is decisive in whether the procedure is compatible with 
the prohibition on refoulement or not.344   
                                                
341 See section 3.3.3.4. 
342 See sections 3.4.3.3, 3.4.3.4. 
343 See sections 3.3.3.4, 3.4.3.4. 
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4 The admissibility of certain 
provisions in the Procedures 
Regulation Proposal 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the examination in the previous chapter will be 
applied to assess whether the articles examined in chapter 2 are compatible 
with the principle of non-refoulement. Firstly, each article, and provisions 
related to that article, will be described shortly. Secondly, the criticism of 
each article presented in chapter 2 will be summed up. Lastly, an assessment 
will be made whether the proposed article is compatible with the principle 
of non-refoulement. 
 
Following the procedure of the ECtHR, an assessment of whether certain 
rules meet the obligations imposed by the principle of non-refoulement 
should include an assessment of whether the rules meet the obligations in 
both theory and practise. 345 Since it is very hard, if not impossible, to assess 
the practical function of rules that have not been implemented, the focus of 
the assessment will be on the compatibility between the rules and the 
principle of non-refoulement in theory.  
4.2 Admissibility procedures (article 36) 
4.2.1 The proposal 
According to article 36 of the Commission’s Proposal, every Member State 
is, in principle, obliged to assess the admissibility of every asylum 
application and reject the application without determining whether the 
applicant qualifies for refugee status or is eligible for international 
protection if any of the grounds for inadmissibility applies.346 
 
The most discussed grounds for admissibility are the concepts of ‘first 
country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’.347 A country shall be 
considered a first country of asylum if the applicant has ‘enjoyed protection 
in accordance with the Geneva Convention’ in that country, or, if he or she, 
’otherwise has enjoyed sufficient protection’ there.348  
 
An applicant shall be considered to have enjoyed sufficient protection if:  
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a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;   
b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Regulation (EU) No XXX/XXX 
(Qualification Regulation);   
c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is 
respected;   
d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law is 
respected;   
e) there is a right of legal residence;   
f) there is appropriate access to the labour market, reception facilities, healthcare 
and education; and   
g) there is a right to family reunification in accordance with international human 
rights standards.349   
 
Before an application for asylum is rejected as inadmissible, the applicant 
shall be allowed to challenge the application of the first country of asylum 
concept in the light of his or her particular circumstances.350  
 
As regards the concept of ‘safe third country’, a country shall be designated 
as safe if:  
 
a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion;   
b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Regulation (EU) No XXX/XXX;  
c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is 
respected;   
d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, 
is respected;   
e) the possibility exists to receive protection in accordance with the substantive 
standards of the Geneva Convention or sufficient protection as referred to in 
Article 44(2), as appropriate.351 
 
The concept of ‘safe third country’ shall be applied if a country has been 
designated safe by the individual Member State conducting the admissibility 
assessment, is designated safe on EU level or in individual cases in relation 
to a specific applicant.352 Such a country shall be considered safe for a 
particular applicant where the Member State, after an individual 
examination: is satisfied that the five criteria above is met for the specific 
applicant, there is a sufficient connection between the country and the 
applicant and the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for 
considering the country not to be safe in the applicants particular 
circumstances.353  
 
Just as in the case of the ‘first country of asylum’ concept, an applicant shall 
be given the possibility to challenge the application of the concept of safe 
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third country in light of his or her particular circumstances before his or her 
application is rejected as inadmissible.354  
 
Where the concepts of ‘first country of asylum’ or ‘safe third country’ 
apply, the admissibility procedure shall be concluded within ten working 
days.355 
4.2.2 The criticism 
The concept of ‘first country of asylum’ has been criticised for, if 
implemented in a mechanical way, leading to the assessment of the risk of 
refoulement not being sufficiently individualised.356 The concept has also 
been criticised for setting a too low standard for what should be considered 
a first country of asylum in relation to a particular asylum seeker since it 
does not require such a country to have recognised the asylum seeker as a 
refugee and that ‘sufficient protection’ is considered enough to deem a 
country to be a first country of asylum.357 
 
As regards the concept of ‘safe third country’, it has received similar 
criticism as the ‘first country of asylum’ concept. It has been argued that 
‘protection in accordance with the substantive standards of the Geneva 
Convention’ would be too weak since the content of this term is uncertain 
and, according to the criticism, implies that the Refugee Convention can be 
applied by states on a ‘pick-and-chose’ basis.358 According to the criticism, 
this already weak protection is further weakened by the possibility to 
substitute ‘protection in accordance with the substantive standards of the 
Geneva Convention’ with ‘sufficient protection’.359  
 
Lastly, the time limit of ten working days for the duration of an 
admissibility procedure where the concept of ‘first country of asylum’ or 
‘safe third country’ is applied, has been criticised as it may not give an 
applicant the possibility to rebut the presumption of safety.360  
4.2.3 The assessment 
The first element to be assessed is whether it is sufficient to have enjoyed 
‘protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’ in order to deem a 
country to be a first country of asylum. It should firstly be noted that it is not 
prohibited to remove an asylum seeker to a country that is not a party to the 
Refugee Convention.361 It can, thus, not be considered a requirement for 
removal, that the asylum seeker has obtained refugee status in the receiving 
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state. While ‘protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’ will 
naturally include protection against refoulement in accordance with article 
33 of the Refugee Convention, it is not sufficient for completely protecting 
against refoulement as required by the ECHR since the scope of that 
protection is wider than the protection in the Refugee Convention. The 
possibility for the individual to rebut the presumption of safety in his or her 
particular case is therefore essential for deeming ‘protection in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention’ as sufficient for considering a certain country 
safe.  
 
The question of whether the concept of ‘sufficient protection’ offers 
adequate protection from a non-refoulement point of view is very much a 
question of how the criteria of that concept is interpreted since the wording 
of the criteria is very similar, but not exactly the same as required by the 
principle of non-refoulement.362 A possible discrepancy between the criteria 
and the protection required by the principle of non-refoulement can, 
however, possibly be mended by the possibility of the applicant to rebut the 
presumption of safety in his or her personal circumstances.  
 
While it is true that the content of the criterion of ‘protection in accordance 
with the substantive standards of the Geneva Convention’ is uncertain, it is 
also flexible enough to be able to interpret in accordance with the 
prohibition on refoulement and can thus not be considered directly 
incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement.  
 
The conclusion is thus that the level of protection required to deem a 
country to be a first country of asylum or safe third country for a particular 
asylum seeker, in theory, meets the obligations imposed by principle of non-
refoulement. 
 
As regards the obligation on states to assess asylum applications 
individually, both the ‘first country of asylum’ concept and the ‘safe third 
country’ concept require states to make an individual assessment of the 
applicability of the concept to a specific applicant. According to the 
Proposal, Member States are also required to give the applicant the 
possibility to rebut the presumption of safety. 
 
As regards the time limit for the duration of the admissibility procedure it 
should be noted, on a general level, that the principle of non-refoulement in 
the Refugee Convention and the ECHR require EU Member States to 
provide the same level of protection to all individuals that fall within the 
personal scope of each Convention. There is hence, not a certain level of 
protection that is sufficient for some asylum seekers but not for others.  
 
The only relevant argument for allowing a much shorter time limit for 
admissibility procedures compared to ‘regular’ procedures, ought to be that 
it is much easier for applicants to substantiate their claims, and for Member 
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States to examine and assess these claims, in admissibility procedures. 
There are, however, no evidence of that this would be the case. Even if the 
admissibility procedure does not render a decision on the merits of an 
asylum seeker’s claim on protection, the procedure leading to the conclusion 
that a certain country is safe for a particular asylum seeker can be just as 
complex as the decision whether he or she is a refugee or not.  
 
It is probably a fair assumption to say that very few would consider ten 
working days sufficient time for conducting a fair refugee determination 
procedure. Given the possible high complexity of certain cases on 
admissibility, it could be considered equally unreasonable to believe that it 
is possible to conduct a thorough, individual assessment of the safety of a 
country in relation to a specific asylum seeker, and give him or her a proper 
chance to rebut the presumption of safety, within ten working days.  
 
It is, however, uncertain what, if any, consequence a Member State will face 
if it fails to comply with the proposed time limit but there are probably only 
two different ways of interpreting the meaning of this time limit that can 
make it compatible with the prohibition on refoulement. Either, it must be 
interpreted as non-binding in order to give Member State the flexibility to 
prolong the procedure if needed, or it must be regarded as a time limit, after 
which a Member State must consider an application admissible unless the 
Member State has been able to prove that the asylum seeker can be removed 
without breaching the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
Even if it is unclear, due to the uncertain role of the time limit, whether the 
proposed admissibility procedure offers sufficient protection against 
refoulement in theory, it is, however, not possible to clearly say that it is 
incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement either. 
4.3 Accelerated procedures (article 40) 
4.3.1 The proposal 
According to article 40 of the Commission’s Proposal, EU Member States 
will be obliged to accelerate the assessment of an application for asylum if:  
 
a) the applicant has only presented facts irrelevant for international 
protection; 
b) the claim of the applicant is clearly unconvincing;  
c) the applicant has misled the authorities; 
d) the applicant is making an application merely to delay or frustrate 
the enforcement of a decision to remove the applicant from a 
Member State; 
e) a third country may be considered a safe country of origin; 
f) the applicant does not comply with certain obligations in the Dublin 
Regulation; 
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g) the application is a subsequent application with no tangible prospect 
of success. 363  
 
A country may be considered a safe country of origin if it can be shown that 
there is generally no persecution, no torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence 
in situations of international or internal armed conflict.364 When making the 
assessment of the safety of a particular country account shall be taken to, 
among other things:  
 
a) the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in 
which they are applied;  
b) observance of rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR; 
c) the absence of expulsion, removal or extradition of own citizens to 
third countries where, inter alia, there is a serious risk that they 
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture, persecution or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where their lives 
or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, or from which there is a serious risk of an 
expulsion, removal or extradition to another third country.365 
 
Similarly to the proposed ‘safe third country’ concept, the countries to 
which the ‘safe country of origin’ concept is going to be applied, are 
proposed to be decided on Union level.366 A safe country of origin may be 
considered safe for a particular applicant only where he or she has not 
submitted any serious ground for considering the country not to be a safe 
country in his or her particular circumstances.367 
 
An accelerated procedure has, according to the Proposal, to be concluded 
within two months, or eight working days if the examination is accelerated 
because the application was made ‘merely to delay or frustrate the 
enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision resulting in his or her 
removal from the territory of a Member State’.368 However, if the 
determining authority considers that a certain case is too complex to be 
examined under an accelerated procedure in may continue the examination 
under a ‘regular’ procedure.369 
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4.3.2 The criticism 
The primary concern with accelerated procedures is that the truncated 
procedure will undermine a fair and qualitative examination of asylum 
applications.370 Because of this risk it has been argued that accelerated 
procedures only should be used when assessing cases where the application 
is clearly fraudulent or the applicant only has submitted issues that are 
unrelated to the grounds for granting asylum.371 
 
In special regard to the ‘safe country of origin’ concept as a ground for 
acceleration, the main criticism is that the concepts stereotypes certain 
applications and thus risks jeopardising the individuality of the assessment 
and that the concept puts a too high burden of proof on the applicant.372 It 
can also be noted that the required level of safety is proposed to be reduced 
from ‘generally and consistently’ no persecution etc. to only ‘generally’.373  
4.3.3 The assessment 
The question of the accelerated procedures’ compatibility with the principle 
of non-refoulement is, in contrast to the assessment of the admissibility 
procedures, not a question of what level of protection that needs to be 
present in a country in order for a Member State to remove an asylum seeker 
to that country without assessing his or her claim for international 
protection. This is because accelerated applications, in contrast to 
applications that are found inadmissible, will be assessed on their merits. 
The level of protection will therefore be decided by the provisions in the 
Qualification Regulation instead of the Procedure Regulation Proposal.374 
The question is, therefore, rather if the accelerated procedure is sufficiently 
fair. 
 
As already concluded, every person falling within the scope of the Refugee 
Convention or the ECHR, has the same right to protection, including the 
same right to get the possibility to substantiate his or her claim for 
protection and get this claim sufficiently examined and assessed. The 
minimum level of procedural fairness required by the principle of non-
refoulement must therefore be accessible to all asylum seekers no matter if 
their applications is assessed in an accelerated or ‘regular’ procedure.  
 
As long as the proposed maximum duration of an accelerated procedure can 
not be considered to be sufficient also for a ‘regular’ procedure, there must 
be specific circumstances in the accelerated cases that show that the 
examination and assessment of these applications do not require the same 
amount of time as those in the ‘regular’ procedure. Since the accelerated 
procedures, as proposed by the Commission, contain grounds for 
                                                
370 See section 2.4. 
371 See section 2.4. 
372 See section 2.4.1. 
373 See section 2.4.1. 
374 Procedures Regulation Proposal, arts 40(1), 37. 
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acceleration that has nothing to do with the complexity of the case, such as 
acceleration due to the applicant having misled the authorities or having 
failed to comply with certain obligations in the Dublin Regulation, is hard to 
argue that there are reasonable grounds for the shorter duration of the 
accelerated procedure, at least in relation to theses grounds. In this regard, 
the level of protection required to deem a country to be a safe country of 
origin is important. The lower the requirements are, the less reasonable it is 
to use the ‘safe country of origin’ concept as a ground for acceleration.  
 
Despite the problem of justifying some acceleration grounds, the possibility 
for Member States to change tracks from the accelerated procedure to a 
‘regular’ procedure, where they find it necessary for a thorough 
examination, leads to the conclusion that the time limit of the accelerated 
procedure, at least in theory, does not pose a problem for the compatibility 
of the procedure with the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
There are no provisions related to accelerated procedures that, in theory, 
hinders Member States from assessing accelerated applications on a case-
by-case basis with due regard to the individual circumstances of each case 
as required by the principle of non-refoulement. It is, nevertheless, possible 
that the result of the accelerated procedures, in practise, can lead to such a 
result. 
 
The conclusion is, however, that the concept of accelerated procedures, as 
proposed by the Commission, in theory is compatible with the obligations 
imposed on EU Member State by the principle of non-refoulement. 
4.4 Implicit withdrawals of applications 
(article 39) 
4.4.1 The proposal 
According to article 39 of the Proposal an application shall be rejected as 
abandoned, for example, if the applicant has not lodged his or her 
application within certain time limits, if the applicant does not cooperate by 
providing his or her fingerprints and facial image, if the applicant does not 
appear for a personal interview or if the applicant has abandoned his or her 
place of residence without informing the authorities.375 If the applicant does 
not report back to the authorities within one month and demonstrates that 
the reason for the applicant not fulfilling his or her obligations was due to 
circumstances beyond his or her control, the application will be considered 
implicitly withdrawn.376 An implicitly withdrawn application shall be 
rejected as abandoned or as unfounded where the determining authority has, 
at the stage that the application is implicitly withdrawn, already found that 
                                                
375 Procedures Regulation Proposal, art 39. 
376 See section 2.5. 
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the applicant does not qualify for international protection.377 An application 
can, thus, be rejected if an applicant forgets the time of a personal interview 
or forgets to report that he or she has moved.  
 
If a new application is made after the first application has been rejected, that 
application will be considered a subsequent application and will only be 
examined on its merits if it contains:  
 
a) relevant new elements or findings;   
b) the applicant was unable, through no fault on his or her own part, to 
present those elements or findings during the procedure in the 
context of the earlier application, unless it is considered 
unreasonable not to take those elements or findings into account.378  
4.4.2 The criticism 
The criticism directed towards the proposed changes to the concept of 
‘implicitly withdrawn applications’ is centred around the fear that the 
inflexible nature of the concept may lead to applicants not getting their 
claims assessed at all.379 This since Member States will be obliged to reject 
applications and an applicant, who’s application is rejected as implicitly 
withdrawn, will have to file a new application which will be treated as a 
subsequent application.380 
4.4.3 The assessment 
The main question is whether the concept of ‘implicitly withdrawn 
applications’ is compatible with the obligation of states not to impose 
procedural requirements on applicants that hinder them from claiming 
protection against refoulement. 
 
If an asylum seeker’s application is rejected as implicitly withdrawn, before 
the applicant has presented all the facts and arguments that he or she wants 
to present to substantiate his or her claim, a subsequent application will, in 
principle, only be assessed on its merits if it contains relevant new elements 
or findings that the applicant, through no fault of his or her own part, was 
unable to present in the context of the earlier application. Since it lies in the 
concept of ‘implicit withdrawn applications’ itself, that the applicant has 
failed to meet the requirements imposed on him or her due to circumstances 
within his or her control, the applicant cannot be considered to have been 
unable to present the elements or findings through no fault of his or her 
own. The applicant’s claim will, thus, only be assessed on its merits if the 
authorities consider it unreasonable not to take those elements or findings 
into account. The risk of being subjected to refoulement should reasonably 
be such a circumstance that would make it unreasonable not to take the new 
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elements into consideration. This protection can, however, be considered 
weak since it relies on the discretion of the authorities in each Member State 
to decide what subsequent applications to assess and not. In this regard it 
should be noted that the ECtHR has found protection based on discretionary 
powers of national authorities sufficient.381 
 
The real problem arises, however, in the potential situation where an 
applicant already has presented all facts and element that he or she wants to 
invoke to substantiate his or her claim when the application, according to 
article 39, have to be rejected by the authorities as implicitly withdrawn, if 
the assessment of the circumstances presented at that point in time would 
lead to the conclusion that the applicant needs protection. In this case the 
authorities would be obliged to reject the application as abandoned and 
would be barred from examining a new application since it would contain 
no new elements. In order to avoid this situation, the strict requirement of 
new elements must be removed or the flexibility given to Member States to 
grant protection even if the conditions for an implicit withdrawal are 
fulfilled. 
 
As previously noted, the ECtHR has said that Contracting States, in 
principle, are free to set procedural requirements for the submission and 
consideration of asylum claims, as long as the automatic and mechanical 
application of such requirements are not at variance with the protection of 
the fundamental value embodied in article 3.382 It can, however, not be 
considered to be in line with article 3 to apply the concept of ‘implicit 
withdrawn application’ in such a way that asylum seekers who has forgotten 
the time of a personal interview or forgotten to report that he or she has 
moved will be barred from protection against refoulement. The conclusion is 
thus, that the proposed article 39 is not compatible with the obligations 
imposed on EU Member States by the principle of non-refoulement. 
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5 Final conclusions 
The research presented in this thesis shows that the principle of non-
refoulement, as it is expressed in the Refugee Convention and article 3 of 
the ECHR, impose obligations on EU Member States that must be respected 
when shaping asylum procedures. In relation to efforts to streamline asylum 
procedures, these obligations require Member States not to remove asylum 
seekers to another country without, either, fairly assessing their asylum 
applications on the merits, or making sure that the country to which they are 
to be sent will offer the them effective protection.383  
 
The assessment of an asylum seeker’s claim for international protection or 
the safety of removing him or her to a particular country must be made 
rigorously, on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the individual 
circumstances of each applicant.384 Member States are also obliged not to 
impose procedural requirements on applicants that will hinder them from 
claiming protection against refoulement and substantiating such claims.385  
 
The assessment of whether the studied articles in the Procedures Regulation 
Proposal are compatible with the obligations imposed by the principle of 
non-refoulement shows that the Proposal, at least in relation to the article on 
implicit withdrawals of applications, is incompatible with the principle of 
non-refoulement. As regards the studied articles on the proposed 
admissibility procedures and accelerated procedures, the conclusion is that 
these articles, in theory, provide sufficient protection against refoulement. It 
should however be underlined that the articles also have to provide 
sufficient protection in practise, something that is hard to assess before the 
articles have been implemented. Therefore, even if the articles provide 
sufficient protection in theory, the criticism directed towards these proposed 
articles may be legitimate. In the case of the proposed article on the concept 
of ‘implicit withdrawals of applications’, the conclusion is that this article is 
incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement since it imposes 
procedural obligations on applicants that can lead to a claim for protection 
being excluded from consideration.  
 
                                                
383 See sections 3.3.3.3, 3.3.3.4, 3.4.3.1. 
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